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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines whether current reconstruction methods in Afghanistan are 
economically efficient and effective with respect to the counterinsurgency mission. My 
argument is that they are not, due to the absence of culturally correct, indigenous 
construction materials and techniques. 
This research explores the impact of construction as a part of a counterinsurgency 
mission, drawing on local cultural factors and building techniques in constructing new 
facilities in Afghanistan. If current methods are not sustainable either culturally or 
economically, then the reconstruction efforts are likely to fail, incentivize corruption, and 
weaken the legitimacy of the Afghan government. If, on the other hand, they are 
sustainable and sensitive to local cultural norms and economic capacity, the likelihood of 
these projects increasing the quality of life, building positive relationships, and 
decreasing violence, increases significantly. 
If reconstruction fails to increase the ability of the Afghan government to develop 
the capacity at the local level, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will not 
have anyone to which it can transfer responsibility for local government services. This 
would seriously inhibit the ability of ISAF to transition to Afghan control and, given the 
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Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it 
tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions 
of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it 
is.1 
         T. E. Lawrence 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
This thesis examines whether current reconstruction methods in Afghanistan are 
economically efficient and effective with respect to the counterinsurgency mission. My 
argument is that they are not, due to the absence of culturally correct, indigenous 
construction materials and techniques. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis is timely and pertinent given the efforts of the United States to develop 
the capacity of the Afghan government and the stated strategic importance of Afghanistan 
in U.S. national security policy. The United States has allocated approximately $51 
billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan.2 This money has been used to build hospitals, 
clinics, schools, police and army facilities in an effort to provide basic health, education, 
and security for the Afghan people.  
 
 
                                                 
1 T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin (August 20, 1917), 
http://telawrence.net/telawrencenet/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-seven_articles.htm. 
2 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United 
States Congress, Arlington, VA, January 30, 2010, 
http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreprots/Default.aspx, 4. 
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO)3 and the Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)4 have published numerous first-hand 
accounts of problems with the current construction processes.5 Inspections and audits 
have also illuminated deficiencies in the planning and construction of facilities in 
Afghanistan. These deficiencies cast serious doubt on the purported effectiveness of 
current methods of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Both the GAO and SIGAR have 
identified the design and construction process as a key area that needs improvement.6  
Understanding the current problems of reconstruction in Afghanistan can lead to 
alternatives that increase the economic efficiency of reconstruction and support the 
counterinsurgency mission. Identifying potential alternatives is of increasing importance 
in the short-term given the stated intent of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) commander, General David Petraues, in his counterinsurgency guidance, to 
develop local government capacity.7 If reconstruction fails to develop the ability of the 
Afghan government to develop the capacity at the local level, ISAF will not have a 
partner to which it can transfer responsibility for local government services. This would 
seriously inhibit the ability of ISAF to transition to Afghan control over time and, given 
the current political environment in the United States, potentially lead to the failure of the 
Afghan campaign. 
 
                                                 
3 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and 
limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (Washington, D.C., 
June 2, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04403.pdf. 
4 SIGAR, Contract Oversight Capabilities of the Defense Department's Combined Security Tranistion 
Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Need Strengthening (Arlington, VA, May 19, 2009), 
http://www.sigar.mil/reports/pdf/audits/Audit-09-1.pdf. 
5 Author’s experience while in Afghanistan April–October 2007 and fellow officers’, accounts from 
2005 through 2009. 
6 GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and limited Resources Have Impeded 
Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed; SIGAR, Contract Oversight Capabilities of the Defense 
Department's Combined Security Tranistion Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Need Strengthening.  
7 General David H. Petraues, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Headquarters, 




This thesis will explore the impact of drawing on local cultural factors and 
building techniques in constructing new facilities in Afghanistan. The information 
obtained could be used by the United States and its coalition partners to appropriately 
utilize their vast expertise in engineering, construction, and technology to help rebuild 
villages and dwellings to cultural norms and improve the sustainability of the facilities. 
The improved sustainability will positively influence the Afghan trust and confidence in 
Afghanistan’s formal and official institutions.  
My argument is, if current methods are not sustainable culturally or economically, 
then the reconstruction efforts are likely to fail, incentivize corruption, and weaken the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government. On the other hand, if they are sustainable and 
sensitive to local cultural norms and economic capacity, the likelihood of these projects 
increasing the quality of life, building positive relationships, and decreasing violence, 
increases significantly. 
C. BACKGROUND  
For the last three decades, Afghanistan has endured the scourge of war. From the 
Soviet invasion and occupation in 1979, to the Civil War from 1989 to 2001, culminating 
in the American invasion following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, peace, 
stability, and progress have been elusive for most Afghans. The current war continues to 
ravage the majority of the country with a peaceful resolution unlikely in the near future.  
The United States and its partners in Afghanistan find themselves entangled with 
an increasingly sophisticated Taliban-led insurgency. Both sides compete for the trust and 
confidence of the Afghan people, yet the ordinary Afghan and his or her interests are 
often lost amidst the fighting and posturing. The coalition is often left fighting an enemy 
that is indigenous in most areas of the country, possesses a superior understanding of 
local cultural customs and mores, and has ties with the population.  
The coalition members, not being from the local area, must learn about local 
customs and culture quickly. They make mistakes. For example, something as simple as a 
female soldier putting her hand out for a local male to shake is unacceptable in most rural 
areas in Afghanistan. Men are not to touch females, and can be dishonored by doing so. 
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Another example, dealing with construction, was with the sight locations of police 
stations.8 A new police station was supposed to be built on a hilltop, a strategic decision. 
Yet, this would have allowed all of the police and foreign visitors to see into the 
compounds of the local houses, where the women worked during the day. High walls 
surround houses in this part of Afghanistan. The housing compound is an area where 
women can move freely and work without covering. If outsiders could see inside, and 
they were not covered, they would be dishonored. They would have to cover themselves 
at all times after the building was built. The women were very upset about this. What 
little freedom they had was being taken away. The U.S. military did not consider this 
when choosing a site for the facility. Eventually another site was identified that satisfied 
all parties. The delay caused by the local population slowed the construction of this 
facility by a full year. Understanding the local culture and the types of actions that can 
impact honor is important in gaining respect from our Afghan partners. Dishonor can 
negatively affect Afghans and their families for generations. Simple mistakes create long-
lasting divides. These mistakes can impact the ability of the coalition to effectively 
respond to the needs of the Afghan population.  
Failing to incorporate cultural norms into the planning process of reconstruction 
projects is likely to increase the possibility that the facility will promote social unrest. For 
example, with the police station discussed above, if the station had been built, the local 
population would have been angry at the coalition for building the facility, the 
government of Afghanistan for supporting it, and the local police for looking into the 
courtyards every day. Instead of making the people feel safer, it would have made them 
feel insecure and angry. Unrest may also arise from a variety of other factors; to include 
construction in sensitive areas, the use of unacceptable materials and techniques, hiring 
the wrong workforce, bringing in workers from a rival ethnolinguistic group, or the 
prevalence of corruption.  
                                                 
8 Author’s personnel experience, Afghanistan, 2007. 
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The United States and its partners have recently emphasized a more population–
centric strategy to battle the insurgency.9 This strategy can be used in the construction 
arena to address the factors that cause unrest, as discussed above. The Coalition must 
effectively protect, support, and respond to the local Afghan population. Until then, 
progress will be limited. After all, as Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason correctly explain, 
“all counterinsurgency is local.”10  
Currently, American and Coalition practices involving reconstruction rarely take 
traditional building methods and cultural norms into account. The quality of construction 
by ISAF is inconsistent. This is due to numerous factors: poor contractor oversight, 
poorly written scopes of work, corruption, and inadequate coordination between all 
parties involved in the reconstruction process. All of these factors have been identified in 
reports from government oversight organization, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. This 
thesis argues that the missing piece in these reports is culture. Even if there were perfect 
oversight, coordination, capacity, and not corruption, there would still be problems if the 
cultural piece were ignored. In Nuristan, for example, metal buildings were designed and 
built in areas where local builders excel in traditional woodwork designs, and wood is 
locally available (Appendix D, Section 1, Case Study 1, Photos 5–15). Local builders are 
unfamiliar with the metal structures, therefore quality suffered and frustrations mounted 
on all sides. Not only was the quality poor and the metal material difficult and expensive 
to transport, but also the buildings were colder in the winter and warmer in the summer 
than the ones built using traditional materials and architectural methods. Even if the local 
workers were capable of building the metal structure, the building would not have been 
culturally acceptable, as it would have been too cold in the winter, too hot in the summer, 
and it does not fit in with any other structures in the area. They are all made from wood 
and rock. Another example is that wood buildings are being built in areas traditionally  
 
                                                 
9 General Stanley A. McCrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” Commander NATO International 
Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan (August 30, 2009), http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf; Petraues, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance.”  
10 Thomas H. Johnson and Chris M. Mason, “All Counterinsurgency is Local,” The Atlantic Magazine, 
October 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/afghan. 
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known for termite infestations (Appendix D, Section 2, Case Study 2, Photo 17) resulting 
in a lower than normal building life expectancy. These buildings are not sustainable 
culturally or economically. 
This thesis argues that the cultural dimension is ignored in the planning and 
construction of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. This understanding is critical if 
the United States and its allies are to effectively shift support and popular Afghan opinion 
against the Taliban. As stated in the classic book Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous 
Domestic Architecture, “It is a mistake to assume that the Afghans will be grateful for, or 
benefit from, reconstruction aid that is not consistent with their environmental experience 
or cultural heritage.”11 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis examines whether current design and construction techniques in 
Afghanistan lead to the construction of facilities that are culturally and economically 
unsustainable. The use of indigenous materials and construction techniques is likely to 
reduce the cost and time to build a facility and to increase the likelihood that the facility 
will be sustainable over time. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Using reports from GAO, SIGAR, and other sources, this thesis explores the 
design, building and maintenance problems of Afghan construction and how this impacts 
the structures’ sustainability. This thesis explicitly links the effectiveness of construction 
with the strategic goals of the counterinsurgency mission. Increased clarification was 
obtained through interviews with SIGAR members, Army Corps of Engineer Contracting 
Officers, Canadian Corps of Engineers members, and military members who have been 
involved with the construction process in Afghanistan. 
 
                                                 
11 Albert Szabo, Thomas J. Barfield and Edward F. Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous 
Domestic Architecture (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 5. 
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This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will cover the definition 
of sustainable construction, how the use of indigenous materials, and techniques has 
changed over time and an overview of Afghan architecture. The next chapter is an 
overview of the groups the military is working with, their histories, and the challenges of 
those relationships. A chapter that discusses the current contractual processes used to 
build in Afghanistan, its history and challenges, is next. The thesis will conclude with 
recommendations and conclusions. 
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II. SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN  
Given the ingredients of the non-literate, peasant-tribal, inward-looking 
society… the human problems appear as monumental as the magnificent 
engineering edifices left on the landscape: but without consideration of the 
human factor, great dams simply make great ruins.12 
  - Louis Dupree in reference to the 1946 Helmand Valley Project 
Sustainable construction and sustainability are defined in many ways. Fowke and 
Prasad, for example, identify over 80 definitions of sustainability.13 This first part of this 
chapter will discuss the various definitions of sustainability and their evolution. A history 
of the construction process will follow, with an emphasis on how the use of indigenous 
materials and techniques has changed over time. The chapter will end with a discussion 
of the indigenous Afghan architecture, the materials and techniques currently used in 
Afghanistan.  
A. WHAT IS SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION?  
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) definition of sustainability deals with the 
final product, the building, and how it will be maintained. The Office of the Deputy under 
Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment defines facility sustainment as: 
Facility sustainment provides resources for maintenance and repair 
activities necessary to keep a typical inventory of facilities in good 
working order over a 50-year service life. It includes regularly scheduled 
adjustments and inspections, preventive maintenance tasks and emergency 
response and service calls for minor repairs. It also includes major repairs 
or replacement of facility components that are expected to occur 
periodically throughout the facility life cycle.14 
                                                 
12 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 483. 
13 Raymond Fowke and DK Prasad, “Sustainable Development, Cities and Local Government: 
Delimmas and Definitions,” Australian Planner 33, no. 2 (1996): 61–66. Cited in Colin C. Williams and 
Andrew C. Millington, “The Diverse and Contested Meanings of Sustainable Development,” The 
Geographical Journal (Blackwell Publishing) 170, no. 2 (June 2004): 99. 
14 Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment, “Facilities 
Sustainment/Modernization/Operation Models (FSM/FMM/FOM),” 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/fim/programanalysis_budget/tool_metrics/FPRS/FSMDescription. 
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The focus of this definition is on the maintenance and repair of the facility. This 
definition does not mention indigenous materials or techniques, nor does it mention 
environmental considerations for the initial construction. After, a new facility is 
requested; several groups within DoD review the project. The environmental department 
is responsible for pre-construction environmental assessments. The project is then handed 
to the contracting department, who works with the customer to write the scope of work, 
then design, and build the project. The focus is on the quality, cost and time to build the 
structure. After the building is completed, the facilities maintenance department is 
responsible for the post-construction maintenance and repair. Several groups are involved 
during the life cycle of the facility. The environmental department, the only group that 
comes close to promoting the use of sustainable materials for construction, spends its 
time on a project’s overall impact on the environment.15 The designers hired by the 
contracting office are encouraged to design buildings with the goal of Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)16 certification in mind, however this 
certification has tradeoffs (the use of more energy efficient windows will lower energy 
consumption later, but are more expensive to purchase) and the cost of the facility is the 
final determining factor in the incorporation of any environmental factors.17 Indigenous 
techniques are not typically the most sustainable alternative in the U.S., therefore, even 
green building designers do not consider it as a priority, when designing buildings. At 
least this has been my experience. Even after attending LEED training, which is the 
foundation for the Green Building Certification, I found that designers were encouraged 
to focus on energy savings, which can be obtained using less traditional materials in the 
U.S.. Newer, more energy efficient materials and techniques are readily available, and 
while they may not be cheaper than the indigenous materials, they last longer and can be 
maintained more easily by the users. The use of these materials and techniques is the best 
choice in the U.S., but is not the best choice for areas that cannot easily access the new 
materials and where the cultural norms preclude their use. The process used by DoD 
                                                 
15 Author’s experience during the last 10 years while working for different facilities departments in the 
DoD. 
16 More information on LEED certification can be found at http://www.usgbc.org.  
17 Author’s personal experience April–October 2007. 
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described above is similar to the process in Afghanistan; however the contracting office 
is responsible for the work performed by all three groups. They work with the military 
point of contact for that project to develop the scope of work. The project is then 
designed in house or via contract, and built. The maintenance of the facility is normally 
left to the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA).  
Non-DoD organizations, like United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and aid Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), that normally 
work in areas where the newer technologically advanced materials are not readily 
accessible or are not culturally accepted use a definition of sustainability different from 
the DoD. These organizations are mostly concerned with up-front environmental and 
cultural considerations and rarely discuss future facility maintenance, as seen below in 
the Holcim Foundation example. This may be because they normally require the 
occupants of the facilities they build to perform the maintenance of the facilities. For 
example, the Holcim Foundation, an organization that promotes innovative building 
practices by funding competitions, symposiums and grants for innovative building 
initiatives,18 encourages “sustainable responses to the technological, environmental, 
socioeconomic, and cultural issues affecting building and construction.”19 They define a 
sustainable project as one that “embraces the preservation of the environment, as well as 
critical development-related issues, such as the efficient use of resources, continual social 
progress, stable economic growth and social viability.”20 Unlike the DoD, these groups 
take the local culture and materials into consideration when defining sustainability. 
The United Nations defines sustainable development in the 1987 United Nations 
(UN) Brundtland Report as the, “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs.”21 A more 
recent report funded by the UN starts off with the premise that the goal of construction is 
                                                 




21 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 43. 
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to “balance the needs of humans with the carrying capacity of the planet.”22 Du Plessis, 
the author of the more recent UN report, cites a “lack of interest in the issues of 
sustainability”23 as one of the barriers to sustainable construction. The transition from 
traditional cultural techniques to the modern techniques is discussed as the point in 
history where the colonial powers insists that “their technologies and criteria for 
development are far superior to anything found in the colonies,” and the local techniques 
and traditions were “actively discouraged.”24 When building in their parent countries, 
where the technologically advanced materials are readily available and are accepted 
culturally, it makes sense for designers to ignore a more indigenous approach to building. 
Most designers only design in and for their parent country. This thesis argues that when 
these designers are asked to design for foreign nations, they often forget to consider that 
indigenous materials may be the most viable alternative due to availability and if they do 
not know the culture for the area, may design a facility that is culturally unacceptable.  
The DoD is now building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Indonesia and many other 
areas traditionally left to non-DoD actors. The non-DoD actors have been building on the 
international stage for decades; they have a well thought out process and are better suited 
for the task in permissive, more economically sound environments. The DoD is the only 
choice for building in non-permissive environments like Afghanistan. This thesis and the 
new counterinsurgency guidance argue that this new role requires the DoD to change 
their processes to fit the cultural environment they are now in, as many non-DoD actors 
did long ago.25 The non-DoD organizations continue to decrease their involvement in 
unsecure areas, leaving the humanitarian and reconstruction mission increasingly to the 
DoD. 
The definition of sustainability used in this thesis combines the DoD definition 
that focuses on the life-cycle costs of the facility and the concept of sustainable 
                                                 
22 Chrisna du Plessis, Agenda 21 for Sustainable Construction in Developing Countries (Pretoria: 
CSIR Building and Construction Technology, 2002), 5. 
23 Du Plessis, Agenda 21 for Sustainable Construction in Developing Countries, 37. 
24 Ibid.  
25 McCrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment”; Petraues, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency 
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construction that focuses on the use of local materials and techniques. Sustainable 
construction examines the social and economic impact of the construction on the local 
community and ensures that the facility is built so the community can maintain the 
facility over a fifty-year service life.  
B. HOW INDIGENOUS BUILDING TECHNIQUES HAVE CHANGED 
OVER TIME 
Before the Industrial Revolution, “families and whole communities would pool 
the labor necessary for large building projects, passing knowledge from one generation to 
the next in the process.”26 The Industrial Revolution led to more complex building 
materials and that required specialist for installation, improper installation led to safety 
problems, which led to building regulations.27 Architectural and engineering professions 
existed prior to the Industrial revolution, however during the Industrial Revolution more 
and more emphasis was placed on college educated architects and engineers.28 Small 
towns and villages still relied on architecture handed down through the generations. The 
bridging and bonding that occurred during the building process were also lost. The 
building codes evolved to prohibit the use of indigenous techniques and materials.  
According to Klinker, many developing countries model their building codes after 
those used in industrialized countries.29 These codes “often favor high-tech, import-based 
materials that can be scarce and expensive in developing countries.”30 The U.S. military 
and USAID both use the International Building Code as a requirement in their 
                                                 
26 Susan Klinker, “Shelter and Sustainable Development,” in Building without Borders: Sustainable 
Construciton For The Global Village, ed. Joseph F. Kennedy (Gabriola, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 
2004), 7. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Donald E. Mulligan and Kraig Knutson, Construction and Culture (Champaign, Stipes Publishing 
L.L.C., 2004), 143. 
29 Klinker, “Shelter and Sustainable Development,” 14. 
30 Ibid. 
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contracts.31 This limits the use of indigenous materials in most cases. Klinker states that 
“What is still lacking in most building codes are adequate guidelines for artisans and 
professionals regarding the safe use of indigenous materials.”32 It is difficult to change 
codes and research on traditional indigenous construction,33 argues it is as earthquake 
resistant as newer technologies, either by itself or with minor modifications. Western 
architects and engineers, who are not familiar with this research may be resistant to using 
the old techniques. 
Most designers are educated in the West, where indigenous techniques are 
sometimes criticized as symbols of primitivism. Chrisna du Plessis states that 
“unquestioning application of building codes and planning concepts from western 
countries introduced during the colonial period” have created a barrier to using traditional 
materials and techniques.34 She then says, “So insistent have the colonial powers been 
that their technologies and criteria for development are far superior to anything found in 
the colonies, that there is a general lack of confidence in home-grown solutions and 
traditions, and these are actively discouraged.”35  
Colonies no longer exist, so why do authors still discuss them? It is because the 
ideas of the past influence who we are and how we act today. Colonies are a part of the 
                                                 
31 USAID, “Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World,” USAID, August 30, 
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Kennedy (Gabriola, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 2004), 168–174. 
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past for many countries, Great Britain, France, and even the United States as the 
colonizers; and most of South America, the African continent, Pacific Islands, and 
Afghanistan as the colonies. Historically Colonial powers tried to change local culture 
encouraging them to adapt to the social norms of their homelands, to include the science 
of building. Colonization, by the Western nations, is in the distant past. However, the 
idea that some countries are superior in knowledge and ideas still prevails. According to 
William Easterly, ““Uncivilized” became “underdeveloped.” “Savage peoples” became 
“third world.”36 He goes on to state that “there was a genuine change of heart away from 
racism and toward respect for equality, but a paternalistic and coercive strain survived.”37 
These developments suggest that, in some environments, local traditional methods should 
be considered as an alternative to outside methods and materials. In Afghanistan, the pace 
of deployments means that a measure of performance is to complete as much 
construction as possible, as quickly as possible. This practice means that engineers may 
not have sufficient time to learn about local materials, techniques, or traditions. Building 
with materials that are familiar, using known techniques is easier. One of the reasons 
using traditional materials and techniques makes sustainable construction more of a 
challenge is because it takes time. Gregg Mortenson argues that you must drink three 
cups of tea and respect the local population’s ideas and priorities to build lasting 
relationships.38 Construction in Pakistan and Afghanistan is more about the relationships 
you build, than the dollars you spend. This is not a new concept; several people 
throughout the last century have advocated an indigenous approach to construction, as 
discussed below. 
1. Research of Sustainable Construction Techniques 
Two advocates for sustainable construction that deserve recognition are Sri Laurie 
Baker and Hassan Fathy. Sri Laurie Baker, an English Architect who lived and worked in 
India for over half a century, developed eighteen guiding principles. Two of these 
                                                 
36 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 24. 
37 Ibid. 
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principles are “study and know local materials, cost, building techniques, and 
construction” and “look closely at your prejudices and question them.”39 These lessons 
are still pertinent today. Another well-known architect was Hassan Fathy. He learned 
traditional techniques from indigenous workers and incorporated them into his designs. 
Fathy used adobe and incorporated claustra’s, pierce walls, malqaf’s (like the Afghan 
bad-gir), or wind catcher, and other traditional features.40 He wrote a book in 1972 that 
described the lessons he learned and how to build using traditional techniques.41 This 
book is used throughout the world by architects and engineers who are trying to emulate 
the work he began. These two individuals could be considered the fathers of the post 
Industrial Revolution sustainable construction movement. Anyone assigned the task of 
designing in Afghanistan should be required to read the books and writings of these two 
individuals. It may allow them to look closely at their prejudices and question them. 
Much research has been done on traditional structures over the last few years as 
well, with most of it focusing on seismic stability. There are five different designs that 
incorporate appropriate seismic stability in the Building without Borders book alone.42 
Some of these discuss retrofitting existing buildings and others are designed for new 
structures.  
Retrofitting buildings to ensure that they are more earthquake resistant should be 
considered in the more seismically active areas of Afghanistan. After the 1993 
earthquake in Marathwada, India, several Indian engineers worked to design “simple 
strategies for retrofitting traditional architecture” for seismic resistance.43 The techniques 
they discovered during their research are applicable in some areas of Afghanistan. 
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Another example that would be appropriate for retrofitting existing buildings is to add 
“wire mesh or fabric and plaster skins” to traditional stone and earth structures will make 
them more resistant to seismic forces.44 This technique is also applicable to new designs. 
There are several other designs that are appropriate for new construction. First the 
design used for adobe construction in Baja Verapaz, Guatemala after the 1976 
earthquake. These adobe structures, built by applying techniques recommended by a UN 
study on earthquake-resistant adobe construction,45 are still standing today, even after 
subsequent earthquakes have damaged buildings in neighboring villages.46 Next, the 
Building Research Institute (BRI) of the University of Kassel, Germany has shown that 
“it is possible to build earthquake-resistant walls from rammed earth, sand-filled cotton 
bags and bamboo” structures, “without using reinforced concrete elements.”47 Finally, 
Kelly Lerner introduces “seismic solutions for straw bale construction”48 and talks about 
the importance of monitoring and evaluating projects by going back and asking questions 
of both the occupants and the builders of sustainable projects and then taking this 
feedback to improve the design.49 The concept of the necessity for a feedback loop is also 
discussed by William Easterly in his book The White Man’s Burden, where he discusses 
how planners disregard for feedback loops creates a critical flaw in existing aid 
formulas.50  
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David Bainbridge also recognizes the importance of feedback and includes it in 
his “Seven-Step Program for Addressing Problems with Housing, Resources, Health, 
Sustainable Food Production, or Environmental Restoration.51 This process can be 
applied to all construction projects in the developing world, and is applicable to 
Afghanistan as well.  
Other organizations that are working on traditional construction techniques are 
Architecture for Humanity, “a charitable organization that seeks architectural solution to 
humanitarian crises”52 and RedR,53 the engineers’ equivalent to Architecture for 
humanity. Although few of the organizations listed above have concentrated their 
sustainable design techniques in Afghanistan, all of their work can be easily adapted to 
the Afghan architecture and environment. 
There are also organizations and individuals researching Afghan architecture and 
its indigenous traditions, to include seismic studies on the resulting structures. Turquoise 
Mountain and Afghan Earthworks are two of the more prominent organizations. They 
have been working to not only ensure that these traditions stay alive in Afghanistan, but 
are researching ways to incorporate western techniques to make the structures stronger to 
resist both blast and earthquakes.  
So, what are the indigenous architectural traditions of Afghanistan? We need to 
understand what is in place before we can learn how to design structures that protect 
these traditions. The existing structures are discussed in detail in the next section.  
C. INDIGENOUS AFGHAN ARCHITECTURE 
This section will cover the types of dwellings found in Afghanistan. The majority 
of material in this part of the chapter is taken from the book Afghanistan: An Atlas of 
Indigenous Domestic Architecture.54 The book, published in 1991, thoroughly examines 
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the plethora of diversity in Afghan architecture and how it is related to the culture of the 
different regions. To aid the reader several maps of Afghanistan are available in 
Appendix A. A map of the different provinces shows how the Afghan government sees 
the country. (Appendix A, Section 2, Figure 7). The physical terrain map shows the 
overall country (Appendix A, Section 1, Figure 1). The varying degrees of elevation and 
geographic zones are identified in the next two maps (Appendix A, Section 1, Figures 2 
and 3). The nomadic route map (Appendix A, Section 2, Figure 8) shows the normal 
migration routes for each region. The nonsedentary structures discussed in this section 
will be found in the regions identified in the text below in the winter. During the rest of 
the year, these dwellings can be found spread out along the route to and from the summer 
grazing areas. These maps are important when discussing the nonsedentary dwellings, as 
they are not usually found in the higher elevations during the colder months, they are 
mostly found in the plains, lowlands and foothills.55 The vegetation map (Appendix A, 
Section 1, Figure 4) shows the vegetation available in the different regions. This is 
important as the traditional dwellings have been designed and built with the material 
available in the region in mind. Some dwellings have similar structural designs, but are 
built from different materials, depending on the region in which they are found.  
There are two main types of dwellings in Afghanistan: sedentary and 
nonsedentary dwellings. The nonsedentary dwellings come in the forms of black tents, 
cotton tents, yurts and huts.56 While nonsedentary dwellings are important to include in 
this thesis for the cultural knowledge they provide on the nomadic populations of 
Afghanistan, the emphasis for this thesis is on sedentary structures and dwellings. 
1. Nonsedentary Tent Dwellings in Afghanistan 
There are several types of nonsedentary dwellings throughout Afghanistan. Black 
tents are by far the most prevalent form of tents in Afghanistan. These are used by the 
Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns and by the Baluch.57 They consist of varying hoops, poles, 
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T-bars and ropes as the frame. Black woven goat haircloth panels are used to cover the 
frame. This cover “absorbs the heat of the summer sun and provides considerable 
shade.”58 “The result is an air temperature ten to fifteen degrees Centigrade cooler than 
the outside air.”59 The black tents are traditionally found in southern Afghanistan. The 
resettlement of Pashtuns forced by Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) brought the tents to 
the north. These tents have begun to replace the yurts in the northern part of the country.  
There are two types of black tents. Vaulted used by the Duranni Pashtun (See 
Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 1) and Baluch (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 2) and 
peaked used by the Ghilzai Pashtuns (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 3).60 The vaulted 
tents “employs hoops with T-bars, or a T-bar alone, to produce a vaulted frame over 
which the pinned panels are stretched taut.”61 Baluch and Durrani tents differ in that the 
Baluch tent does not use the T-bar. This style of tent is common in the southwest, from 
Heart to Kandahar. It is also found in the north from Kunduz to Maimana.62  
The peaked black tents used by the Ghilzai Pashtuns are common in western 
Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. Their structure consists of poles and ropes that 
hold the black covering in place. When the residents remain in one area for a while, they 
may build a small mud or stonewall at the base of the tent. The nomadic Ghilzai Pastun’s 
who live in these tents travel annually from the Pakistani border region to central 
Afghanistan.63  
There are two smaller tribal populations that use the peaked black tents. They are 
the Brahui (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 4) and the Taimanis (See Appendix B, 
Section 1, Plate 5). The Brahui live along the southern part of the Helmand River, by the 
Iranian border. Their tents resemble half of a Ghilzai tent as they only have two rows of 
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poles.64 The Taimanis live in the Tulak area by the Farahrud River. Their tents are like a 
rectangular yurt. A rectangular frame made from willow poles reinforced by a transverse 
bar for lateral stability. A ridgepole runs the full length of the middle of the tent. Woven 
reed mats enclose the walls of the tent. Wooden pens attach the black panels. This tribe is 
sedentary.65  
The traditional association of the structures of these tents may be skewed in the 
northern regions. Uzbeks, Tajiks and other ethnicities, who traditionally use yurts, have 
transitioned to the black tent, due to its ease of use, construction and movement. The 
black tents are by far the most prevalent tent structure in Afghanistan.66 
The cotton tents are used less frequently in smaller areas. The Jugi and Jat tribes 
use ‘store bought’ white cotton tents with colored patches sewn on for decoration.67 The 
Jugi reside around the Samangan area and the Jat live around Kabul. The Jugi tent uses 
four poles (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 6). The covering only covers one wall, 
which is slanted at a 45-degree angle. The Jugi move from one place to another and are 
known for begging and telling fortunes.68 The Jat structures are similar to traditional U.S. 
Army tents. Bamboo poles support the structure (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 7, 
Photo 1). If the Jat are in an area for a while they will build a small mud wall around the 
tent. This wall will grow in time creating a small permanent looking structure with a cloth 
roof. The Jats are not well liked and are known to be peddlers, entertainers, and artisans.69  
2. Nonsedentary Yurt Dwellings in Afghanistan 
Yurts are the most complex type of nomadic structure. They are used in two 
distinct regions of Afghanistan.70 The Turkmen, Uzbek and Central Asian Arabs in the 
northern part of the country use the domical yurts (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 8). 
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These yurts have walls of linked lattice, roof poles held together at the top with a roof 
ring, felt for a roof.71 Like other structures, if they are in place for any amount of time, a 
low mud wall is built around the structure. The Firozkohi of the Sufak region uses conical 
yurts (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plate 9). The basic structure of this yurt is the same as 
the domical yurts, with the exception of the pointed roof.72 Only the rich families have 
yurts. The poorer families use chaparis.73 
These structures are disappearing from Afghanistan. The lack of skilled artisans 
required to build the structure; the cost, weight and the movement of nomadic groups into 
villages and more permanent and cheaper chapari huts have reduced the need for these 
structures.  
3. Nonsedentary Hut Dwellings in Afghanistan 
There are several types of huts with circular, polygonal, rectangular and ovate-
oblong shapes (See Appendix B, Section 1, Plates 10-14). All of these huts are described 
in the Szabo and Barfield book.74 These descriptions are summarized in the chart in 
Appendix C, Section 1.  
With the exception of Bamiyan, who is known for three different types of huts, 
two circular and one polygonal, huts are found in small geographical areas, with the huts 
in those areas distinct in their design. There are four types of circular huts, one polygonal, 
two rectangular and three ovate-oblong.75  
The Uzbeks, Arabs, Tajiks, and Turkmen all use the Lacheq circular hut, in the 
Samangon area. This structure is made from flexible wooden poles that are bent over to 
form the roof. It looks like an inverted basket. The wall covering is made of woven reed 
matting and the roof is made from plaited grass or flattened reed matting.76 
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Northeast of Kunduz are the Central Asian Arab rectangular, kapa-i-arab huts 
made from wooden poles tied together to make a roof. They are covered with Felt or 
white canvas.77 The Tajiks and their ovate-oblong, kapa huts are also found in this 
region. They are made with poles that are bent over to make a roof. They have reed mat 
walls and plaited grass or flattened reed mat roofs.78 
North of Kunduz is the home of the Arabs Circular, kappa-i-chamshi hut, 
constructed entirely of reeds. Smoke must filter out the top, as there is no smoke hole. 
Walls are covered with reed mats or plaited grass. The Central Asian Arabs with their 
rectangular, chubdara hut is also found in this area. It is also constructed of reeds, but has 
a wooden frame for roof support.79 
Bamiyan is the home to the Hazara. They build three types of huts. The chapari 
with and without a center pole is built with twenty-four poles that are bent to form a roof. 
The wall is made from reed mats and the roof is covered with felt.80 The polygonal 
chapari is built like the circular chapari, but with only twelve poles, giving it a distinctive 
polygonal shape.81 
Ovate-oblong huts are built by both the Durrani, along the Helmand River, and 
the Ghilzai, west of Jalalabad. The Durrani huts called Kodai are constructed by building 
a clay wall with embedded poles. The poles are bent to form the roof and the roof and 
walls are covered with bundles of straw.82 The Ghilzai Pashtun huts are also built by the 
Baluch and Brahuis. They are constructed of scrub tamarisk boughs, which are bent to 
form the roof. These structures are covered with loosely woven tamarisk mats. They are 
mudded in the winter. The mud is removed during the summer months.83  
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4. Sedentary Dwellings in Afghanistan 
The sedentary dwellings can take the form of caves, curved-roof construction and 
flat-roof construction (See Appendix B, Section 2, Plates 15-20 and Photos 2-4).84 A 
database for these structures is located in Appendix C, Section 2. 
The local structures designs are the result of thousands of years of ‘research’ by 
local architects. The bad-gir is a good example of an addition that is widely used locally 
but rarely incorporated in foreign designs. These additions are found in both flat and 
curved-roof constructions. In areas with constant prevailing winds bad-gir’s or wind 
catchers are built onto the roofs (See Appendix A, Figure 5). These structures “face into 
prevailing winds and provide air circulation” into the structure.85 This design feature is 
mostly found in the Harat area, but can be seen in other regions as well.  
Some traditional structures are designed to withstand seismic tremors (See 
Appendix A, Figure 6). “The earthquake-resistant properties of senj construction were 
undoubtedly learned in part by observing which buildings, or parts of buildings, remained 
standing after severe tremors.”86 There are many local traditions that can be considered 
when building in Afghanistan.  
Another tradition is how the local builders orient structures. Review of the 
orientation of local structures show that they normally face the south and southeast. This 
orientation allows the maximum amount of solar energy during the winter and minimum 
in the summer.87 A short interview with a local builder, or research into the regional 
norms, can be incorporated into the architect’s time when designing structures in 
Afghanistan. This will ensure that local techniques are considered and possibly 
incorporated into the designs. Review of the different structures is the basic level of 
knowledge required. A short sedentary structure review can be found below.  
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5. Sedentary Cave Dwellings in Afghanistan 
The first type of sedentary structure is the cave. One region in Afghanistan 
currently uses caves for domestic housing, Bamiyan. It was common in the past in many 
regions; however, the practice has slowly disappeared as construction materials become 
more prevalent and cost effective.88 Other types of structures are also used in Bamiyan, 
and Coalition forces should use these freestanding structures for reconstruction. 
Therefore, there will be no further discussion of caves. Curved-roof and flat-roofed 
dwellings will be covered in detail. 
6. Sedentary Curved-Roof Dwellings in Afghanistan 
The next type of sedentary structure is the curved-roof structures. These structures 
are normally found where wood is not readily available or where wood boring insects are 
prevalent. They are found throughout the Western portion of the country and in 
Kandahar.89  
Curved roofs have some advantages over flat roofs. In warmer climates the living 
area stays cooler because the heat rises into the roof area. The layer of heat at the ceiling 
level keeps heat from entering the house from the roof. The walls must be thick to 
“compensate for the lateral thrust generated by the dome or vault.”90 The thicker walls 
provide better insulation than the thinner flat-roof structures. The curved-roof structures 
are broken down into four forms.91 
The first type of curved roof construction uses sun-dried brick domes and vaults. 
Sun-dried bricks are not as strong as fired bricks. However, this is the most common 
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Northwestern and Western part of the country, from Samangon in the North to Girishk in 
the South. “The bricks are held in place with quick-drying, highly viscous mortar.”92 The 
top is covered with traditional mixture of mud and straw.93 
The next two types use fired bricks.94 They are found in and around Kandahar. 
Because the flat roof architecture is preferred, but wood boring insects preclude their use, 
a domed roof is built with a flat roof on top of the domed structure, giving a flat-roof 
appearance. This type of roof is very heavy. Stronger fired bricks are required to ensure 
structural integrity. There are two types of fired brick curved roofs. One has one large 
dome and the other; more recently introduced has multiple domes.95  
The large domed structure uses a “rib-vault system.”96 This along with the fired 
bricks and thick walls ensures structural integrity. The small or multiple vault and beam 
roofs are a more recent addition to the Kandahar architecture. These structures 
incorporate the use wood beams to support a series of small vaults. The recent 
introduction of treated wood products has allowed the introduction of this type of 
structure. “Ribs are not needed since the span is shorter resulting in thinner walls.”97 This 
reduces the cooling advantages of the curved roof structures. 
The final type of curved-roof structure is found in the South West along the 
Helmand River and is used by the Durrani Pashtun and Baluchi.98 It is the winter 
dwellings for agricultural villages. These dwellings are sometimes abandoned in the 
summer for vaulted black tents. The walls are constructed of rough oversized sun dried 
brick and mudded tamarisk boughs or reeds are used to create the roof.99 This type of 
construction is confined to a small region because of the availability of the materials. 
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Tamarisk and reeds are prevalent along the Iranian border, Helmand river region.100 It is 
not widely used and should not be considered for reconstruction building due to the semi-
permanent nature of the buildings. Sun dried brick structures are also found in this region 
and their construction would be a better use of reconstruction dollars. 
7. Sedentary Flat-Roof Dwellings in Afghanistan 
The last types of sedentary dwellings are the flat-roof structures. These structures 
are prevalent where wood is readily available. There are five types of flat-roof 
structures.101 The brick and mud walls are found throughout central and eastern 
Afghanistan, with the exception of Nuristan. Massive mud wall construction is found 
from Kabul to Kandahar, to include Bamiyan. Timber and stonewalls are found in 
Nuristan. These will all be discussed in detail. The last two types are the massive 
stonewalls and brick and wood frame construction. These types of construction are only 
found in the isolated mountainous regions of Salang and Istalif. They should be 
researched further if structures are to be built in this region, but will not be covered by 
this paper.102 
The first two types of structures are similar. The techniques used to build the 
brick and mud wall structures are similar to those used to build the structures inside the 
massive mud wall structures or qala’s. The walls are made from pressed mud or sun dried 
brick. The roof is made with poplar joists. Split poplar is then laid at right angles to the 
joists. A layer of reeds and clay finish the roof structure. The walls are covered with a 
mixture of mud and straw.103 This technique is similar to the adobe construction of the 
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gradient within the structure. Additionally, these structures are preferred to domed roof 
structures in cooler climates as the heat is kept within the living areas, instead of rising 
into the roof structure.104  
The massive mud wall compounds are found in the regions that have traditionally 
experienced a lack of security. The enormous walls and defensive towers built onto the 
corners are resonant of this fact. The walls require constant maintenance due to erosion. 
Stonewalls also traditionally found in this region can be built to an acceptable height for 
protection and require little or no maintenance. Stonewalls provide a better use of 
reconstruction dollars.  
The final type of sedentary structure covered by this paper is the timber and stone 
walled structures found in Nuristan. They are “elaborate post and beam construction 
employing no nails.”105 They are usually two stories and are traditionally built on steep 
mountainsides, to ensure the fertile land in the valleys are reserved for farmland. “The 
walls of these structures are constructed of alternating layers of squared timber and stone. 
The space between the timbers are filled with stone and then packed with clay.”106 The 
timbers interlock at the corners, like square Lincoln Logs. The roof is a post and beam 
construction with four elaborately carved center posts. It has a square opening in the 
center. Layers of wood shavings, crushed stone and pressed clay are used to finish the 
roof. They are held in place by wooden fascia planks, secured by vertical struts mortised 
into protruding roof beams and joists.107 These buildings are some of the most beautiful 
structures in Afghanistan.  
D. CULTURE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH DWELLINGS 
As the previous section explains, dwellings and other structures in Afghan 
villages are products of their environment but also their culture. Resources available are 
modified to fit cultural needs but the environment itself can determine the layout of a 
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building or village, regardless of cultural elements, however the differences between 
ethnolinguistic groups must also be taken into account (Appendix A, Section 2, Figure 9). 
In many cases, the competition of these two forces creates structures and villages, which 
may seem at odds with each other when, in reality, they are the result of a compromise 
between what is desired, what is required and what is available. 
Beginning with the Pashtuns in the south and the east, one finds relatively similar 
village and dwelling structures despite the differences in the multitude of Pahstun tribes, 
mainly the Durranis and Ghilzais. The variance in terrain, vegetation, and raw materials 
encompassed in the Afghan state can be more critical than culture when building in 
specified regions (See Appendix A, Section 1, Figures 1–4). From the deserts in the south 
to towering mountains in the north, this region is inhospitable for all but the heartiest of 
people who have chosen to live there.108 This resulting geographic divide created 
division among the Durranis, who reside in the south, and the Ghilzais, who live to the 
east and the north. As Johnson points out, “This division between highland Pashtuns and 
those living in the better lands at lower elevations is another major fault line running 
through Pashtun society…this…divide (being) between nang and qalang cultures: nang 
referring to the honor code of the hill men, and qalang referring to the superior, irrigated 
farmlands of the valley historically susceptible to taxation.”109 Consequently, societal 
structure has evolved differently, with the Ghilzais, historically lacking the resources for 
sustained sedimentary living and thus adhering to the more fundamental egalitarian 
concepts of Pashtun tradition and Pashtunwali, while the Durranis have taken advantage 
of the more cultivatable lands, therefore establishing a robust sedimentary society with a 
more hierarchical nature.110  
Despite these differences, architecturally, dwellings and villages are remarkably 
similar, mainly because of environmental causes. A key element found in most Pashtun 
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villages in the eastern region is the Pakhsa wall, a massive pressed mud structure, which 
serves as a barrier to the elements, as well as adversaries. These walls surround what is 
known as a qala, or fortified compound, often filled with wood-based flat roofed 
dwellings, its size depending on the amount of resources available, in this case mainly 
clay.111 While these fortified settlements make sense in relation to the Durrani’s 
hierarchical nature and desire to protect wealth and power, they seem at odds with the 
Ghilzai’s more egalitarian lifestyle. However, when one looks at the environment, as well 
as the Pashtunwali ethic, privacy and security one can see how strong villages and 
dwellings are necessary for protection against the elements but also against rival clans in 
a lifestyle predicated on the maintenance of honor. Generally, as Szabo points out, “The 
thick walls enclose…individual dwellings, and protect inhabitants from bandits and the 
occasional violence resulting from tribal hostilities or rivalries…The housing…reflects a 
more solitary and isolated mood” where “privacy is valued.”112 Other differences seen in 
nonsedentary dwellings and sedentary structures in the east and west are due mainly to 
geographic and environmental variances, with a reliance on reed-based construction or 
brick arches where wood is lacking.113  
In the northern and central regions, one finds the Tajiks and Hazaras, ethnic 
groups with different backgrounds and culture but occupy dwellings that are more in tune 
with the environment and resource limitations than culture (See Appendix A, Section 1, 
Figure 3). The Tajiks, like the majority of ethnic groups in Afghanistan, have found 
themselves continually on the receiving end of Pashtun dominance of the government in 
particular and Afghanistan in general. Consequently, rivalries have erupted between the 
two groups, each vying for its share of the Afghan state. As an ethnic group, the Tajiks, 
according to Conrad Schetter, have often “face(d) a difficulty in developing an idea of 
their own spatial and historical origins. In defining themselves…Tajiks…preferred a 
regional rather than an ethnic identity and still refer to themselves as Panjshiris, Kabulis, 
                                                 
111 Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture, 141. 
112 Hafizullah Emadi, Culture and Customs of Afghanistan (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), 127. 
113 Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture, 119. 
 31
Shomalis, Heratis…”114 The Hazaras, on the other hand, have been much maligned 
throughout Afghan history, and often occupied the lowest rung on the Afghan tribal 
ladder.115 While academic views have changed as to the origin of the Hazaras, the poor 
perception of the tribe ingrained in Afghanistan, mostly because of Pashtun ideology, has 
limited their growth in society.116 
How these ethnic backgrounds relate to the architecture of the Tajiks and the 
Hazaras is unclear since most of the structures of these two ethnic groups do not have a 
strong cultural context. Instead, while culture does play a role in the use of traditional 
huts instead of black tents found in the south, the environment dominates the structure 
and location of the Tajik and Hazara villages and dwellings. Since the western and 
northern regions lack sufficient wood, the Tajiks rely on brick vaulted structures, as 
described earlier.117 These vaults have the advantage of superior temperature regulation 
in both summer and winter periods. Tajiks also use stone in their construction, again a 
factor of location and materials available and the harsh winter environment.118 The 
Hazaras are able to utilize the wood found in their region to construct the typical flat 
roofed style dwellings found in the eastern areas of Afghanistan.119 Both ethnic groups 
do use similar nonsedentary housing, in this case, the hut. While not as mobile as the 
black tents in the south, the Tajiks and the Hazaras choice of the hut reflects their cultural 
ties to the past. This is the same reason why huts have not made their way south in 
abundance, as the tribes in the south prefer the black tent. In the end, while the 
environment plays a large role in the dwelling choices of the Hazaras and the Tajiks, 
which is understandable because of their locations, culture still has an impact in their 
nonsedentary structures.  
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Lastly, in this section, I will examine the unique interplay of culture and 
environment in the case of Nuristani architecture. While many subgroups and sub tribes 
exist, which will not be discussed in detail because of time and space constraints, 
noticeable difference between these groups are minimal and can be attributed mainly to a 
variance in building materials or geography. The Nuristanis, on the other hand, show how 
geography, and resources can work in concert with culture to create a unique dwelling 
structure. The Nuristanis are located primarily in the northeastern region of Afghanistan, 
between Kabul and the border with Pakistan.120 As an ethnic group, the Nuristanis have a 
distinctively open culture, which can be traced to their history of polytheism and terraced 
living.121 Only recently converted to Islam, the Nuristanis retain an egalitarian-based 
society, which is reflected in their dwellings.122 
Since they reside in a mountainous region with abundant forest as a resource, the 
Nuristanis have utilized wood to a great degree. The availability of timber has allowed 
them to build terraced structures up the sides of the neighboring mountains.123 While this 
construction efficiently uses the space allotted by the environment, it affords little privacy 
for the inhabitants. However, as a culture, the notion of privacy is not as critical to 
Nuristanis as it is to a fellow egalitarian ethnic group, the Pashtuns. As Emadi explains, 
“In contrast to the high, thick outer walls and segregated interior rooms of a traditional 
village settlement, there is little privacy in a Nooristani community. Houses hold tight 
against the mountainside and to each other and all significant movements, recreation, 
work, and socializing takes place on the open roofs.”124 In other words, the Nuristani 
culture and the environment have complemented each other with the result being a truly 
distinct ethnic habitation.  
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In the end, as the analysis above shows, both the culture and the environment play 
large roles in shaping the dwelling of the Afghan people. Without taking this into account 
fully, the United States and its allies will continue to lack the leverage with the average 
Afghan to counteract the influence of the Taliban insurgency.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The first part of this chapter gave some insight into why the U.S. government has 
been resistant to using indigenous traditions in its designs. It is not a part of the U.S. 
military’s culture to consider this during the design process because their processes come 
from within the U.S., where construction using traditional methods is not the norm. This 
is part of the reason that the DoDs definition of sustainable construction focuses on the 
50-year service life. Also, sustainable construction in the U.S. does not include 
indigenous materials and traditions, because these are not more sustainable than modern 
materials and techniques. The newer materials are readily available everywhere in the 
U.S. including at the local Home Depot. This is not always the case in other countries. 
The non-DoD organizations that build in areas where traditional construction is the norm, 
and newer materials are not readily available, have a definition for sustainable 
construction that reflects the acceptance of these traditions. Their culture does not focus 
on the long-term service life as much as the military does, because they turn the buildings 
over to the local populations, who performs the maintenance. A combination of these two 
definitions and cultures, and an understanding of the vast differences in the indigenous 
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III. NGOS, AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE COALITION 
MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The new focus of the U.S. military on counterinsurgency and reconstruction has 
created a new battle space, where the cooperation and coordination with aid agencies is 
critical.125 Aid agencies can come in many forms, for example, NGOs, such as CARE, 
Catholic Relief Services, the Red Cross, and Mercy Corps, Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IGOs), like the UN aid agencies, and interagency organizations126 like the 
Department of State (DoS) and the USAID. The aid agencies historically have a long 
history in the areas they operate. They normally know the local culture and norms of the 
area. This is true in Afghanistan as well. Understanding the background of these 
organizations and their relationships with the Afghan government will help the military to 
build a partnership with these culturally imbedded organizations, resulting in smarter, 
more productive, culturally correct counterinsurgent mission designs. It will also allow 
for an understanding of the proper materials and techniques to use when building.  
Some NGOs have been working in Afghanistan since the end of World War II. 
They have helped the people of Afghanistan when no one else seemed interested. Their 
numbers grew when helping the Afghan refugees during the Soviet occupation and due to 
the increase in funding since 9/11, is again on the rise. They have become a critical part 
of the Afghan landscape. The relationships that these NGOs have built over the last 30 
years can be an advantage for the Coalition forces in their quest to build a strong central 
government. These same relationships can also be used to delegitimize the new Afghan 
government. Understanding the history of the NGOs in Afghanistan will offer decision-
makers and the military insight into their world. The inability of the Coalition and the 
new Afghan government to effectively respond to the needs of the Afghan population has 
had an enormously negative impact on its mission in Afghanistan. The Coalition and the 
                                                 
125 McCrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 1–1; Petraues, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance”; Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005. 
126 The DoD defines interagency organizations as U.S. government organizations, like the DoS and 
DoD. See Headquarters Department of the Army, “FM 3-07 Stability Operations,” A–1. 
 36
Karzai government are battling for the trust and confidence of the Afghan people. The 
NGOs can be a critical piece in this battle. They have built relationships that allow them 
to respond to the needs of the population. Understanding how to work with them and 
learning from them can provide a powerful tool for the Coalition’s toolbox. So, why are 
NGOs important to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, apart from the cultural knowledge 
and relationships they bring? 
In the past NGOs built their own facilities and structures, apart from the Afghan 
government, the military and other interagency organizations. The Afghan government 
outlawed this practice in 2005, as will be discussed further in the Afghan government 
section of this chapter.127 NGOs now work with the other agencies, like the U.S. Military 
and USAID, to build these facilities. They either build them as a contractor to these 
agencies, or they wait until the structures are built and then use the facilities. For 
example, a medical NGO would either build a clinic as a contractor or move into a 
finished clinic to access the population. The military/NGO partnership has strengthened 
because of this law, both organizations work closely together to ensure that Afghans 
receive the services and aid in even the most remote areas of the country. 
This chapter is broken down into four sections. First, a discussion of the history of 
the NGOs in Afghanistan, how and why their numbers have ebbed and flowed over the 
years. Next will be an introduction to the Afghan government and their involvement and 
impact on NGOs. Then there is a discussion of the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) concept, the military, and how their mission impacts NGOs. A short section on the 
other players in the reconstruction game, the IGOs and interagency aid organizations is 
next. Finally, the conclusion will discuss possible suggestions on how to build better 
relationships.  
B. BACKGROUND 
NGOs are non-profit organizations that perform a multitude of service and 
humanitarian functions. They can be both local and international organizations. During 
                                                 




the Soviet occupation, they provided relief to over 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 
By the end of 2001, the number of Afghan refugees had swelled to over 5 million.128 
After the Soviet invasion, NGOs were banned from Afghanistan. The UN and the Red 
Cross could no longer operate in Afghanistan, due to formally recognized organizational 
mandates. The UN can only work with formally recognized governments. The Red Cross 
could not gain consent of all the parties involved in the conflict.129 NGOs, working 
illegally, were the only organizations providing cross boarder help into Afghanistan.  
The Pakistani authorities, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and the U.S. government funded NGOs in Pakistan and Afghanistan area. 
These three organizations directly funded the refugee camps and programs until the early 
1980s. This changed when the U.S. Congress approved a shift, to fund NGOs, who would 
then fund the refugee programs.130 After the U.S. changed policy, all other donors 
followed. “All three actors changed their strategies and began channeling assistance to 
Afghan refugees and displaced persons through NGOs.”131 This created more funding for 
NGOs.  
In the early 1980s, there were 17 NGOs. By 1992, the number of NGOs had 
grown to around 160.132 The funding for these organizations had also grown from under 
$10 million per year in the early 1980s to around $300 million.133 The growth in NGOs 
began to decline a few years after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. 
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In 1988, NGOs were able to enter Afghanistan legally for the first time in many 
years. Ongoing struggles for power continued to plague the country. The main 
mujahedeen leaders went to their regions and began to fight each other for power. To 
survive NGOs had to work with the warlord commanders in the some areas, the 
commanders in turn required a share of the donors’ funding (up to 40% of the total was 
considered tolerable by most donors).134 The NGOs were able to operate in remote areas 
by financing the commanders; however, they impacted the natural balance of the area. 
This practice affected the Afghan government, as the funding provided by the NGOs was 
used to fuel the warlords’ insurgency.  
New NGOs were set up after the Soviets left, with the encouragement of the 
UN.135 They were then sub-contracted for the specific area of need. Mine-clearance 
NGOs are an example of this.136 The increase in the amount of NGOs continued to grow 
until the Taliban takeover, in 1996. Similar to the Soviet era, the UN left along with most 
international organizations. Humanitarian assistance from NGOs was sparse at best. 
Humanitarian organizations were allowed to operate in the country until July 1998, when 
the Taliban essentially closed “all NGO offices.”137 The UN left a month later, leaving 
the poor Afghans with no assistance.138  
With the U.S. invasion in 2001 and subsequent collapse of the Taliban 
government, security increased and NGOs began to operate in Afghanistan once again. 
The role of NGOs is increasing, along with the numbers. The original emergency relief  
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agencies, who have operated in Afghanistan for decades are now partners in reducing 
violence and post-war reconstruction. NGOs are becoming a larger and larger part of the 
overall aid process.  
NGOs receive almost fifty percent of the total development/humanitarian funding 
provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC) and European Union 
(EU) member states.139 These organizations are increasingly using NGOs instead of their 
own people to dispense aid. Funding has come from new sources as well. Large 
corporations concerned about their images began to partner with NGOs to show that they 
did their part to help the needy of the world. The Red Cross signed agreements with IBM 
and CNN for example.140  
There seemed to be no limit to the amount of money that NGOs could obtain. 
From 2002-2008 $14,744 Million Dollars were disbursed by donor nations, with the U.S. 
leading the way with $5 Billion.141 This led to what today is called the “NGO Warlord.” 
This term came from Afghans who saw NGOs, who make significantly more money than 
the average Afghan job, driving nice new SUVs and living in gated, fenced 
compounds.142 The NGOs were seen as living like the old warlords, while the Afghans 
they assisted live a very different life. The local Afghans were not the only ones who 
noticed the new lifestyle of the NGOs, the new government officials, who were not paid 
very well, noticed too. 
C. THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 
The Afghan governments of past and present have looked at NGOs with 
suspicion. The funding the NGOs were required to pay the Afghan commanders to 
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operate (up to 40% of the aid in some regions, as discussed previously) during the civil 
war and the Taliban rule, which helped to fuel the insurgency, provides a good reason for 
this belief. The government understands that NGOs are needed to provide the social 
services that the government cannot provide, however that service can come at a high 
price for the already weak Afghan government, by effectively replacing it. Some NGO 
organizations have openly criticized the Afghan government, for its inefficiency and 
corruption.143 This along with the perception that NGOs are attracting qualified workers 
away from the government’s own reconstruction efforts, because they pay higher wages 
has caused much dissention between the NGOs and government. Once the qualified 
workers are hired by the NGO, the government is forced to hire the NGO to do the work, 
at a higher cost, because the government no longer has the ability to do it.144 When the 
NGOs openly criticize the Afghan government, it affects the governments’ legitimacy, 
especially in areas where the NGOs have been working for decades and are more 
respected than the government.  
Research, by Emilie Jelinek,145 has shown that relations between NGOs and 
government officials were good when the government personnel were involved in the 
planning and implementation of projects. This relationship was further fostered by NGOs 
who invited government personnel to trainings and inaugurations.146 When government 
agencies were unfamiliar with NGO capabilities, they were prone to request more than 
the NGO was able to provide. The result of this has been frustration from both parties. 
Communication seems to be the key to good NGO/government relationships. When the  
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government feels it has no control over the funding or influence in the selection of 
projects, its trust of the NGOs decreases. In 2005, the government began to make changes 
to ensure its participation and ability to influence the project selection process. 
The government implemented a new NGO law in June of 2005.147 This law 
created a legal framework for NGOs in Afghanistan. It was good and bad news for 
NGOs. The bad news was that it required the NGOs to register with the Ministry of 
Economy and made “participation in construction projects and contracts”148 illegal, 
unless permission was obtained through the Minister of Economy. The Minister of 
Economy can issue special permission if the Chief of the Diplomatic Agency, or 
Ambassador, of the donor country requests the NGO perform the construction. This 
clause has made it extremely difficult to get permission to build in Afghanistan. Instead 
of building themselves, NGOs now partner with organizations like the USAID to supply 
the facilities, while they provide the services. The NGOs either build the facilities as a 
contractor to USAID or the military, or they wait until someone else builds the facility 
and then provide the services that the building supports. Another requirement of the new 
law requires the NGOs to consult with the government before they implement projects. 
This part of the law has been difficult for the government to implement and enforce. 
Significant delays, with the approval process, have caused NGOs to either give up on 
projects or start them without government authorization.149 These restrictions changed 
the way NGOs operated, but allowed the government the oversight it lacked. So, why did 
most NGOs, who were being restricted by the government like the new law? The major 
reason was that it distinguished between NGOs and the private sector. This change 
stripped the NGO title from profit making businesses, increasing the credibility and 
impartiality of the remaining NGOs. Prior to this law private for profit businesses were  
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allowed to claim NGO status, allowing them to use the NGO name throughout the local 
communities while giving them tax-exempt status. The new law took that option away 
from them. 
Another change for the Afghan government was approved at the donors’ 
conference in London in January 2006. The Afghanistan Compact150 project created at 
the conference represents one attempt to better coordinate assistance.151 This plan directs 
funding through the Afghan government, allowing for more direct control of NGOs and 
project selection. The problem is that the document has no “teeth.” There are no 
restrictions for donors or NGOs who refuse to follow the plan. After the conference the 
Afghan government wrote the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)152 
This document is an overarching framework that discusses the importance of 
coordination among the many actors involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In a 
strong, clean government, the use of the framework identified in this document would 
allow for a well-functioning reconstruction and peace-building process. The government 
of Afghanistan is unfortunately weak and corrupt. Even so, part of the framework is 
working well. The coordination between the Coalition and the Afghan government’s 
reconstruction efforts is functional. The military coordinates and mentors Afghans in 
several different Ministries, like the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. At 
the District level, PRTs have ensured that the Director of Economy has input into the 
selection of projects and the selection of the contractors hired to perform the work.153 
The coordination between the Coalition, Afghan government and NGOs is another story. 
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D. THE ROLE OF AFGHAN NGOS 
As of May 2009, there are 1,297 local and 313 international registered NGOs in 
Afghanistan, according to the Afghan Ministry of Economy.154 They are involved in a 
multitude of services, though most NGOs focus on health and education related issues. 
NGOs have also been involved in demining, restoration of infrastructure, and human 
rights issues.  
NGOs employees who choose to work in Afghanistan are normally dedicated aid 
workers. As Emilie Jelinek said in a 2006 Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief 
(ACBAR) report,  
Afghanistan is undoubtedly one of the most difficult countries for NGOs 
to work in. From the poor security environment, to having to share an 
operational space with military actors and working with a weak and, at 
times, hostile government, NGOs must find a space in which they can 
work effectively in order to assist the country’s poorest and most 
vulnerable people.155  
Some NGOs did not like the changes made in 2005 and decided that they could 
not work within the constraints placed on them by the government, so they left. Several 
dozen stayed.156 They “changed their communication strategy towards the government 
and international community.”157 They joined together in groups and into new 
coordinating agencies in an attempt to better communicate with the Afghan government. 
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substantial information available on these bodies and their members on their websites.158 
In an attempt to add legitimacy to the NGO profession in Afghanistan, they created a 
Code of Conduct that “professionalized” the NGO community.159  
The ACBAR, the largest coordinating organization, was the first organization to 
implement the NGO Code of Conduct. It was formed in 1988 and represents 100 
international and Afghan NGOs.160 Several other NGO coordinating bodies work in 
Afghanistan. Two of the larger ones are the British Agencies Afghan Group (BAAG) and 
the American Council for Voluntary International Action (Interaction). BAAG has 23 
members operating in Afghanistan.161 Interaction has 180 members, of which 44 are 
active in Afghanistan.162 These organizations have been successful in communicating the 
challenges of its members to the Afghan government and the outside world. One of the 
main challenges to the NGOs of Afghanistan is security. 
Poor security is a problem throughout Afghanistan. Anti-government and anti-
coalition forces make it difficult for NGOs to provide services to those most in need. In 
the past, as discussed above, the NGOs could pay off the commanders in the areas and 
continue to bring aid to the local populations. This has been changing. Since 2001, the 
government and coalition forces have been providing humanitarian aid. This practice is 
confusing the population; they are having a difficult time distinguishing between the 
NGO workers and the government and military.163 The insurgents are having the same 
problem. The Taliban described three female aid workers they killed in 2008, as “foreign 
spies.” For example in 2008, a Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Muhahid, said, that they 
had attacked “foreign invader forces” that “were not working for the interests of 
Afghanistan and they belonged to those countries whose forces... took Afghanistan's 
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freedom.”164 This resulted in the aid organization that the women worked for closing 
their Afghan office.165 NGOs are leaving unsecure areas, leaving the population without 
the aid they so desperately need. Another problem impacting NGO security is that they 
are working directly for the government. Some government led programs like the Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS), and development under the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP) are contracting NGOs to carry out their mission.166 If the insurgents 
attack these NGOs, then they are attacking the government, by decreasing the availability 
of the government run program. The impartiality of the NGO has been compromised in 
these situations. 
The security issue is not as prevalent in the major cities. NGOs more easily 
operate in the secure regions of Afghanistan, Kabul, Kandahar and the northern part of 
the country. They are also able to operate in areas close to most of the Provincial PRTs, 
as security is better in these areas as well. Few operate in the unsecure areas of the 
country. “Many aid agencies have been forced to restrict their movements to insecure 
provinces.”167 Humanitarian operations in the unsecure areas are left to the military. This 
is not the best solution as it leads to the confusion issue discussed above when the NGOs 
do return to the areas, making the NGOs more likely to be a target than before the 
military efforts. The main military humanitarian organization is the PRT. 
E. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND THE PRT 
PRTs were created under the Bonn donors’ conference agreement in 2001.168 
PRTs were introduced to expand the influence of the Afghan government’s 
reconstruction efforts and provide security outside the Kabul area of influence. It is a 
team of military, diplomatic and reconstruction subject matter experts. The group is led 
by a military officer and has a staff of around 100 people, both military and civilian. The 
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funding for PRT projects comes from many sources, most from the government running 
the PRT (USAID and State Department in the U.S.-run PRTs). The Commanders 
Emergency Response Fund (CERP) funds are used by many of the U.S. PRTs due to their 
ease of use. The CO of the PRT can use his discretion on where to spend the money, this 
seems to be working to reduce violence. O’Connell demonstrated in his quantitative 
study, that “agriculture development, rural development, and natural resources 
development aid, which directly targeted the livelihood of most Afghans, namely rural 
farming produced the greatest results in decreasing the localized risk from the 
Taliban.”169 A separate study on Iraq resulted in the conclusion that the use of CERP 
funds was connected to the reduction of violent incidents.170 PRTs work independently 
so there are significant differences from one PRT to another. This is to aid the 
regionalization of the PRT. Each region of the country is different hence each PRT 
should be different, to be able to better communicate with the plethora of ethnolinguistic 
groups. As discussed in Chapter II, one size does not fit all in Afghanistan. Some PRTs 
distinguish the military security missions from the civilian missions by using different 
uniforms or otherwise visibly distinguishing themselves.171 NGOs appreciate these 
efforts, because they believe that the populations’ inability to distinguish between the 
militaries security and humanitarian missions, and their further blurring of the NGO and 
military missions has led to the deterioration of their security.172  
The PRT focus has been more short term, to win the hearts and minds. This does 
not always take into account the long-term consequences of the projects. NGOs work on 
mid to long-term focused projects with ensured sustainability. Initially, PRTs provided 
infrastructure and services to communities without requiring participation or ensuring 
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that the community had a true understanding of the future maintenance cost of the new 
infrastructure. This undermined the NGO projects that normally required the local 
community to support the project in some way. For example, the NGOs require the local 
population to provide the chairs for new school projects and a percentage buy-in on 
microloans. PRTs have learned from the NGOs and now require the local population to 
sign a ‘Terms of Use’ contract. This contract states that the PRT is providing a self-
sufficient resource and will not be responsible for its upkeep. This is a step in the right 
direction. The PRTs are learning from the NGOs.  
The PRT/NGO relationship is a complicated one. They have similar goals. NGOs 
want to bring humanitarian aid and education to the local population, because it is the 
right thing to do, regardless of who is the president of the country. PRTs want to do the 
same thing, but for a different reason. Their goal is to bring humanitarian aid and 
education to the communities, with the motive of bringing legitimacy to the Afghan 
government. The problem lies in that when the military provides aid and personnel, it 
blurs the line between the NGOs and military. There has been a marked increase in NGO 
deaths since the start of this practice.173 The NGO workers are no longer viewed as 
impartial actors, but as an arm of the government. A clear distinction between the 
military/PRT and NGOs will help the NGOs accomplish their mission. Something as 
little as ensuring that the military are in uniform when they provide assistance will help to 
ensure that the local population can distinguish between the two. If the area is insecure, 
the PRT will need to protect the NGO by using clandestine meetings at local government 
or United Nations offices. This will allow the NGO to meet without putting them at risk. 
The association with the military alone is reason for the insurgents to target NGOs in 
some areas. If the area has significant security issues, the NGO may only want a phone or 
electronic relationship with the military. The military should not take offense to this and 
should understand the risk the NGO is taking by communicating with the military at all.  
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F. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
The military codified its place in the humanitarian and reconstruction domain 
when it published the U.S. Department of Defense’s Directive 3000.05.174 This directive 
makes stability operations a core U.S. military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to 
conduct and support. They [are] given priority comparable to combat operations and [are] 
explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, 
organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, 
and planning.175 
This was an unpleasant surprise for most NGOs. This document places the 
military squarely in traditional NGO territory. Concerns range from the issues discussed 
above, mistaken identity and blurred identity, to competition for funding. Where the U.S. 
government may have paid an NGO in the past, they now perform some of the traditional 
NGO activities themselves. According to directive 3000.05, this mission will continue to 
grow. As Nancy Roberts says in her article, “The military sees NGOs and IOs as “force 
multipliers” (a reality they resent), NGOs and IOs see the military as trying to “politicize 
humanitarianism” (a reality they resent).”176 The military needs to learn to work with 
NGOs and they will now need to learn to work with the military. Roberts states this 
nicely, when she says, “Civilians need the military to provide information about the 
terrain, operations, and affected populations, and in high-threat conditions, they often rely 
on military transportation and logistics. The military needs civilians for humanitarian 
assistance and for their knowledge and expertise in the reconstruction and development 
of devastated areas.”177 A partnership has been formed. 
In areas where the security situation precludes NGO operations, the NGOs and 
military agree that the military should provide aid when possible. The NGOs would just 
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like for the military to do it in a way that distinguishes them form the NGOs, so that 
when the security situation improves and they return to the area, they are not at an 
increased risk of attack. 
G. OTHER AID ORGANIZATIONS 
There are several other types of aid agencies with which the military must 
coordinate. A short description of these groups will create a complete picture of the 
complex aid environment that is Afghanistan. 
1. Interagency Organizations 
The U.S. military falls into the interagency category, according to Army’s 
Stability Operations Manual.178 This group includes all U.S. government organizations. 
The Department of State was identified as the lead U.S. agency for reconstruction 
and stabilization operations in 2005.179 It is their job to coordinate all of the U.S. 
Governments efforts. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS) is tasked with management of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.180 The CRS department has had a difficult time implementing 
the coordination of the reconstruction effort due to a combination of several factors. For 
example, interagency organizations use different databases to manage their reconstruction 
efforts. While the issue of interagency coordination has received attention in 
congressional reports, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, and may change in the 
future, there is not much hope for changes in the way NGOs track their projects and the 
databases they use. 
The next organization in this category is USAID. They are “and independent U.S. 
government agency that answers to the President through the Secretary of State.”181 
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Therefore, they work for the DoS. USAID provides assistance in multiple sectors, like 
“economic development, agriculture, health, democracy and governance, environment, 
humanitarian response, and conflict management and mitigations.”182 They provide 
significant stability operations type assistance. There is normally a USAID representative 
at each PRT, and have their own contracting organizations, separate from the military, to 
achieve their reconstruction objectives. Just like the military, USAID hires NGOs to 
complete their reconstruction objectives.183 
2. Intergovernmental Organizations 
The United Nations is the main Intergovernmental Organization operating in 
Afghanistan. They have several different groups working with Afghanistan. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is the UN 
organization trying to coordinate all humanitarian activities. They have had a difficult 
time due to the security situation. A safe house their people were housed in was attacked 
last year resulting in several casualties. This prompted the organization to evacuate their 
people and assess the security situation.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been working in 
Afghanistan for over 50 years.184 They also work with NGOs to provide services to the 
local communities. 
H. CONCLUSION  
Understanding the history of the NGOs in Afghanistan will allow decision makers 
insight into their world. The inability of the Coalition and the new Afghan government to 
effectively respond to the needs of the Afghan population has had an enormously 
negative impact on its mission in Afghanistan. The Coalition and the Karzai government 
are battling for the “trust and confidence” of the Afghan people. The NGOs are a critical  
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piece in this battle. They have built relationships that allow them to respond to the needs 
of the population. Understanding how to work with them and learning from them will 
provide a powerful tool for the Coalitions toolbox. 
This chapter reviewed the history of Afghanistan’s relationship with the NGOs. It 
showed how there is a background of contention and mistrust. This will never be totally 
overcome because the legitimacy of the government is not the mission of the NGOs; 
indeed their very existence delegitimizes the government. The government’s new NGO 
law in 2005 allowed the Afghan government more control over the NGOs and their 
projects. While this has been a difficult change for the NGOs, it has increased the level of 
trust between the organizations. The formation of umbrella organizations that negotiate 
on behalf of the NGOs has also improved the Afghan government/NGO relationship. The 
relationship can get better. Communication seems to be the key to a better relationship in 
this case. The more the NGOs communicate their plans and projects to the government 
the more the government will trust the NGOs. 
Increased communication between the NGOs and the military may not always be 
the answer in the NGO/PRT relationship. The risk of the NGOs increases with the 
increased cooperation and coordination with the PRT’s. This is not a problem in secure 
areas; however, it is a significant problem in unsecure areas. The level of communication 
and coordination will depend on the level of security. The NGOs cannot put their people 
at risk to provide information to the PRTs. The PRT must recognize this constraint and 
allow for alternate communications methods. The PRT must also recognize that the 
humanitarian and reconstruction aid delivered by the military PRT must be 
distinguishable from the NGO delivery. This will increase the security situation for the 
NGOs. 
This chapter has covered the Afghan NGO history and the relationships between 
the Afghan government, the PRTs and the NGOs. Several suggestions are outlined above. 
The NGOs are made up of reasonable, hard working, well meaning people, who want to 
help. The Afghan government and the military PRTs should continue to try to work with 
these organizations to ensure that the people of Afghanistan receive the aid they deserve.  
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING 
AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN 
Money is ammunition; don’t put it in the wrong hands. Institute “COIN 
Contracting.” Pay close attention to the impact of our spending and 
understand who benefits from it. And remember, we are who we fund. 
How we spend is often more important than how much we spend.185 
  General David Petraeus – COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance 
“The primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation is to foster 
development of effective governance by a legitimate government,” according to the U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual.186 It also states that the local population will 
decide who will win the conflict.187 If this is the case, then winning the trust and 
confidence of the local population is critical. Reconstruction plays a major part of this 
strategy if it employs large amounts of local workers with minimal training and provides 
valuable infrastructure. One way to accomplish this construction is to contract it out to 
local construction companies. This means that construction contracting is critical to 
winning the trust and confidence and to achieving our goals in this conflict.  
According to the Congressional Research Service, local nationals account for 
70% of the workforce in Afghanistan.188 Construction is one of the major employers in 
Afghanistan, with billions of dollars spent since 2001. Yet, quality remains of concern, 
suggesting that resources have also been wasted since 2001.  
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The U.S. Congress has shown significant interest in this topic and recently passed 
legislation189 in an attempt to rectify several of the factors that have led to the lack of 
construction quality. This legislation provides the funding necessary to improve contract 
oversight and provide necessary training for contracting officer representatives (CORs).  
This chapter will explore reconstruction, its role in the overall Afghan mission, 
and how it is tied to the counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stability Operations doctrine. The 
U.S. uses contracting to achieve its reconstruction goals, so a historical overview of the 
challenges facing contract administration in general will follow. Then, a discussion of 
two different oversight organizations and their findings, followed by a discussion of four 
key findings and lastly a discussion on why culture is important.  
A. COIN AND STABILITY OPERATIONS 
The first part of this section will focus on how the military defines COIN and 
stability operations. This is important so that full understandings of how these two types 
of operations are tied. First, the U.S. Army defines Counterinsurgency as “those military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to defeat insurgency.”190 They define stability operations as “operations that promote and 
protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information 
dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime 
developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.”191 The 
definition of stability operations is similar to COIN, but can also be in response to a 
crisis, which could also be a natural disaster or other events. It is not limited to the 
insurgency environment; therefore, stability operations can be used in a wider range of 
operations. This thesis will focus only on the insurgency aspect. According to the 
Stability Operations Manual,  
During an insurgency, stability operations are executed simultaneously 
with offensive and defensive operations. They compliment and reinforce 
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offensive and defensive operations. Because they begin to address the root 
causes that lead to the insurgency, stability operations are often the most 
critical for defeating an insurgency.192 
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual goes on to break stability operations down into five 
primary tasks. These tasks make up five of the seven COIN lines of effort (LOE). 
Therefore, stability operations make up over seventy percent of the COIN effort. This is 
important because as will be seen later in this chapter construction plays a part in all five 
of the stability operations tasks. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 prioritized stability 
operations as “comparable to combat operations.”193 General Stanley McCrystal’s initial 
assessment in Afghanistan stated that, “Success demands a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.”194 In addition, General David Petraeus recently 
provided detailed counterinsurgency guidance to the “Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, 
and Civilians of NATO ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.”195 COIN has been 
identified as a critical part of the Afghan war. Stability Operations is a critical part of 
COIN, and construction is a critical part of stability operations. 
COIN and stability operations are not new in the U.S.. The Stability Operations 
Manual outlines several examples of these missions, throughout our history.196 The U.S. 
has codified its COIN doctrine in Field Manuals since the early 1950’s.197  
Since the beginning of the Afghan and Iraq wars, the Army’s establishment has 
taken a new look at COIN and its effectiveness. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency 
(2009), was written as an update and compilation of several prior COIN publications.198 
                                                 
192 Headquarters Department of the Army, “FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency,” Headquarters 
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., (April 2009): 7–1. 
193 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. 
194 McCrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” 1–1.  
195 Petraues, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” 
196 Headquarters Department of the Army, “FM 3–07 Stability Operations,” Headquarters 
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. (October 2008): 1–1 to 1–3. 
197 FM 3–24.2, ix. 
198 Ibid. 
 56
FM 3-24.2 is not the only recent COIN doctrine. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have resulted in a plethora of COIN manuals, directives, research papers and 
books.199 The trend towards civil/insurgent conflict versus state-to-state conflict began 
after the end of the cold war and continues to date, therefore this lessons that are learned 
today will likely be pertinent for the foreseeable future. 
1. Stability Operations Tasks 
The Tactics in Counterinsurgency Manual breaks COIN down into seven different 
LOEs; establish civil security, establish civil control, support governance, restore 
essential services, support to economic and infrastructure development, support host 
nation security forces and conduct information engagement. The seven LOEs “are a 
means for tactical units to manage a stability operations numerous tasks, achieve unity of 
effort, and restore the legitimacy of a host nation government.”200 The first five of the 
LOEs are the five tasks of stability operations.201 The manual states that the tasks must 
operate simultaneously and be evaluated frequently. The Stability Operations Manual 
breaks the first five LOEs in more detail.202 I will use both of these manuals to evaluate 
how construction fits into the Counterinsurgency doctrine. Each LOE will be evaluated 
separately. 
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a. Establish Civil Security 
This LOE is all about bringing security to the people. This includes 
protecting people and key infrastructure, and bringing peace to an area. Construction of 
demobilization camps, and repairing and building checkpoints are required as a part of 
this LOE.203 
b. Establish Civil Control 
This LOE covers establishing law and order to a region. The host nation 
military and police will need training and work sites. The judicial system will need to 
have places to hold court and finally the courts will need places to hold and then send 
people who break the laws. Repair and construction of police and Army training sites, 
bases and stations, courthouses, and jails are needed under this task.204 
c. Restore Essential Services 
This is one of the first tasks. It encompasses the humanitarian mission of 
providing food, water, shelter, medical and educational assistance. As a part of this LOE, 
temporary housing for refugees, permanent housing for villages, health clinics, hospitals, 
and schools should be built.205 
d. Support Governance 
Support for governance is a main way that an outside organization can 
help to provide legitimacy to the host nation government. Transitional Administrations 
are normally weak and will need the outside support. Anticorruption initiatives and 
elections are a part of this LOE as well. Repair and construction of federal, state and local 
government facilities may be needed. This may include everything from a capital 
building to a local small town city hall. These types of facilities can be co-located with  
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some of the other facilities, for example, a town hall that has a health clinic, courthouse 
and police station. This shared arrangement would be cheaper to build and more easily 
secured.206 
e. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development 
This task is important at the national and local levels. According to the 
Operations Manual “Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and 
installations needed for society’s functioning. Degrading infrastructure affects the entire 
population.”207 It covers a lot of different areas, everything from building roads to 
facilitate transportation and trade, to public works projects, which encourage businesses 
to bring in new factories, to telecommunications. The schools, medical clinics, municipal 
buildings, all discussed in other tasks above also fall under this area. Damn and irrigation 
projects are another good example of infrastructure. This task is also important because it 
plays a big part at the local level. The majority of this work is contracted out, and 
therefore can strengthen the local economy, and increasing both capability, and capacity. 
Care must be taken however to ensure that local rivalries and hierarchies are known and 
local governments and shura’s are used to increase transparency and decrease corruption. 
Knowing the culture and customs of the area are critical to the success of the mission. As 
shown in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, COIN and contracting are tied. We 
must incorporate COIN into our contractual processes. This has been a challenge over the 
last nine years. I will explore why next. 
B. HISTORY OF CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACTING AGENCIES 
The U.S. military has relied upon contractors since the revolutionary war, when 
they provided many of the same things that they are providing to the military in today’s 
conflict; clothing, weapons, goods and services, etc.208 After the Cold War, the DoD 
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began some new initiatives. First, the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act209 
in 1998, and then the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76210 study 
processes.211 The FAIR act required the government agencies to provide an annual report 
on inherently governmental functions and to contract out all non-inherently governmental 
functions when it was cost effective to do so. The OMB Circular provided guidance on 
how to implement these changes. This significantly increased the amount of contractors 
working for the government. Everything from cooks, janitors, to security personnel are 
now under contract. The loss of military and civilian DoD personnel, who performed 
these jobs in the past, has impacted the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Contractors 
must now perform this work.  
Currently contractors make up 50% of the total force in the CENTCOM AOR.212 
The use of contractors has some advantages, as contractors can be hired more quickly 
than the military or DoD workforce. Contractors can, in theory, be fired more quickly if 
they are not working out or if there is no longer a need for the services they provide. 
Contracting, however, poses significant issues for the DoD. 
The main problem with the use of contractors is that the DoD does not have the 
acquisition workforce to provide oversight for all of the contracts. The reduction in the 
workforce began in the 1980s and will be discussed in greater detail in the oversight 
portion of this chapter. This reduction has impacted the ability to oversee contractors in 
the U.S. and overseas. Afghanistan is no exception.  
Poor oversight and lack of coordination between agencies has resulted in 
redundant projects and wasteful spending. Another problem from lack of coordination is 
when too much infrastructure is built in a particular region, and the local government is 
unable to sustain the new facilities. Many organizations have researched and written 
reports about the issues discussed above. GAO and SIGAR are the two main 
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organizations working on these issues. Their findings are discussed below. These 
organizations and their findings are not unique, several other organizations reports have 
reached the same or similar conclusions, USAID, DoD Inspector General (IG), the State 
Department, and the Congressional Research Division (CRS) to name a few. 
1. GAO 
The GAO is known as “the investigative arm of congress,”213 they are tasked to 
“investigate how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars.” The GAO was one of 
the first organizations to investigate contractor issues in Afghanistan. One of their first 
reports on Afghanistan214 stated that USAID, who provided the majority of U.S. 
reconstruction aid, did not have funding allocated for reconstruction assistance until 17 
months after the Bonn Agreement was signed. This means that the funding did not arrive 
until May of 2002. The report basically says that there were no tracking mechanisms in 
place to ensure proper allocation of the funds, and it recommended that USAID set up a 
way to track their projects and the associated funding. Another GAO report, written in 
July 2004, discussed the lack of “trained personnel to provide effective oversight of its 
logistics support contractors.”215 The lack of qualified personnel on the ground to 
monitor contracts, whether they are logistics, services or construction contracts remains a 
critical problem even today. The wording in this document is almost exactly the same as 
reports by both the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General in 2008216 and the 
SIGAR report dated 19 May 2009.217 While the problems are the same for both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the volume of reports produced by the GAO from 2004 until present is 
significantly swayed toward Iraq with approximately 40 reports dealing with Iraqi 
rebuilding and three reports on Afghanistan. For this paper, I will discuss Afghanistan, 
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however the contractual issues discussed in the Iraq reports seemed to also apply to 
Afghanistan. It was the focus of the majority of the reports and hence garners the same 
level of scrutiny as the Iraqi conflict. This trend seems to be changing with the creation of 
SIGAR. 
2. SIGAR 
SIGAR was created by the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act,218 its 
mission is:  
to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by 
conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and 
investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds and by 
keeping the congress, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense, 
currently informed of reconstruction progress and weaknesses.219  
SIGAR travels to construction sites to check the construction quality and after the facility 
is built they ensure the facility is maintained and used for its intended use. According to 
the law,220 they are required to submit quarterly reports. The 30 October 2009221 report is 
the most recent of five. They have also completed five audits and five inspections to 
date.222 Their audits and investigations are thorough and their investigators are 
knowledgeable about construction and contracting.  
The October 2009 quarterly report identified several items that need 
improvement. Four aspects that are pertinent to this chapter are the lack of coordination 
of all organizations funding construction to ensure there is no duplication of effort, 
building the capacity for Afghans so that they can sustain the infrastructure built for them 
and working to defeat corruption.223 This report does not discuss the need for oversight 
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of contracts, but prior SIGAR reports and papers do address this need.224 The July 
quarterly report states that “as the funding to rebuild Afghanistan increases, so will the 
demand for oversight, which is critical, not only to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, but 
also to ensure the reconstruction program is as successful and cost-efficient as 
possible.225 These four items: coordination, capacity, corruption, and oversight are 
essential to the reconstruction effort. They will now be reviewed in detail. 
a. Coordination 
It is critical that organizations building in Afghanistan work together to 
ensure that there is no duplication of effort with their reconstruction projects. “SIGAR 
has recommended that U.S. civilian agencies and military commands work together to 
develop integrated management information systems that would provide a common 
operating picture of reconstruction programs and projects.”226 This is a very good idea. In 
the early days after the invasion, USAID, the Department of State, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO’s) and the U.S. Military (U.S. Forces Command- Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A), Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Afghanistan Engineer District (AED)) were all working 
on reconstruction for Afghanistan. They rarely communicated with each other. Their 
database systems were incompatible, so the information that was shared was either word 
of mouth or briefing slides. The NGO part of the equation changed a little in 2005, when 
the Afghan government passed the new NGO law,227 requiring NGO’s to register their 
organizations and banning them from construction work unless they had permission from 
the Afghan government. This has reduced the NGO construction work significantly. 
USAID, the State Department and the military still do not have an integrated 
management information system. The importance of sharing information to help planning 
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and coordination activities is thoroughly discussed in a SIGAR audit report dated Jul 
2009.228 This report concluded that an integrated management information system would 
“provide essential information for decision-makers and stakeholders to better plan, 
coordinate, monitor, and report on U.S. activities.”229 This would greatly enhance the 
ability for all of the U.S. funded organizations to share information with one another and 
with outside organizations to ensure that they are not duplicating work that the other has 
already accomplished or has planned for the future. Once the facilities are built, who will 
maintain them? That leads to the next item, capacity. 
b. Capacity 
Building capacity to ensure that the facilities built can be maintained is a 
major challenge in Afghanistan. All types of facilities have been built by a multitude of 
organizations both Afghan and international. Roads, hospitals, health clinics, power 
plants, police stations, army bases are just a few examples of the facilities put in place. 
Once they are built, they must be maintained, if they are not, the lifespan of the facility 
will be greatly compromised. It is easier to repair a small leak in a roof than to replace the 
entire roof, after the leak has grown. The CERP program is trying to address this issue by 
requiring the local Afghan government to sign an agreement to provide sustainment for 
the project as a part of the approval process for their projects.230 This is a step in the right 
direction, however, according to USFOR-A, “the evidence is overwhelming that 
Afghanistan cannot sustain the projects that we complete.”231  
When I was building Afghan National Police (ANP) stations in 
Afghanistan in 2007, several buildings were built and turned over to the Afghan police 
and police trainers. After a few months of use, we would go back to check the condition 
of the facilities. For the most part, the facilities were not well cared for. Sinks would be 
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broken off of the walls, windows would be broken, to exhaust homemade heaters, heating 
and cooling units were removed or in disrepair. The Afghan police said that they were not 
concerned, because the U.S. would build them a new facility if this one were destroyed. 
This attitude seemed pervasive throughout my tour in Afghanistan. The problem was that 
there was no money to repair the damage and the Afghan’s did not understand that they 
needed to maintain the facilities. The Minister of the Interior (MOI), who was in charge 
of the police mission, did not seem to have the funding to repair the facilities and the U.S. 
military had not funded it either. After several years, the U.S. decided to fund the 
maintenance for the Afghan National Security (ANS) facilities, just as the Afghans 
expected, we paid for the repairs. They were no longer responsible to care for the 
facilities. A contract for the maintenance of the Afghan National Army facilities was 
completed in 2007. The Afghan National Police facility maintenance contract was 
released in August 2008. The U.S. government has not contracted for the maintenance of 
all of the facilities that have been built. The Afghans will have to find a way to maintain 
the infrastructure that is built in their country. Part of the problem with the police stations 
is that the police are not paid well, so they sometimes remove items from the newly built 
facilities and sell it to make some money. If we can reduce this practice, the maintenance 
cost will decrease. This leads into the next item: Corruption. 
c. Corruption 
Lack of pay for the police is a challenge, each level of supervision keeps a 
little of the local policeman’s pay. By the time it reaches the lowest levels, there was little 
or no money left. This results in many local police taking money from the local 
population to ensure their families were fed. Paying the police through direct deposit is 
helping to curb this issue. This corruption was commonplace in the police stations I 
visited. This also added to why generators and air conditioners disappeared shortly after 
the facilities were turned over. The police forces were hungry, so they would sell 
anything that they could remove from the facilities. Even the best built buildings, seemed 
to “fall apart” due to the pilfering. The lack of police pay and the resulting destruction of 
newly built facilities is just a small example of the overall impact of corruption in 
Afghanistan. The drug trade and existence of warlords are some other examples that exist 
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in Afghanistan. SIGAR is working with the Afghan government’s High Office of 
Oversight (HOO), an entity implementing the country’s anti-corruption efforts to help 
Afghanistan “meet its anti-corruption mission.”232 Corruption can also impact the 
contracts when contractors bill for services that they did not provide or charge for 
construction that is not built to the specifications of the contract for example. Contract 
oversight is critical to insure that contractors provide the quality and amount of services 
in the time required by the contract. This leads to the next, and final item, oversight. 
d. Oversight 
Contract oversight issues are as old as contracting itself. Without oversight 
contractors can charge what they want and provide subpar services or material, to include 
construction. Contracting oversight issues have plagued the United States since the late 
1990s. Several GAO reports over the last eight years address the importance of contract 
oversight, or lack thereof.  
Contract oversight manning concerns was identified as a problem in the 
U.S. in 2002, when the GAO released a report titled “Acquisition Workforce Department 
of Defense's Plans to Address Workforce Size and Structure Challenges.”233 This report 
discussed the dwindling acquisition workforce. There was a 50% reduction in acquisition 
personnel from 1989 to 1999. This was the culmination of DoD downsizing caused by 
acquisition reforms, base realignment and closures, and congressional direction.234 The 
shortage was exacerbated by the fact that 50% of the remaining personnel were eligible 
for retirement by 2005.235 The shortage of acquisition personnel was impacted further by 
the continued increase in contracts. This increase was due in part by the FAIR Act, as  
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discussed earlier in the chapter.236 Increasing the amount of contracts and decreasing the 
contracting workforce has had a detrimental impact on the oversight of projects that has 
continued to date.  
Another GAO report in December 2006 stated its concerns that the 
Secretary of Defense had not taken action on several items that the GAO had addressed 
since the mid 1990s. One of these items was the lack of “adequate contractor 
oversight.”237 The lack of oversight has been identified over and over, yet nothing 
significant was changed until 2008, with the formation of SIGAR. They provide quarterly 
reports to congress that combine data from all other audit agencies. The Congress seems 
to be listening. Another recent change is that the A76 process was temporarily suspended 
until the Office of the Secretary of Defense completes a formal study of the process.238 
This is a significant change and a step in the right direction. 
Why did this take so long? I have not been able to find an answer. SIGAR 
was created by congress in January 2008; this is several months before the presidential 
election held in November 2008. Was the new focus due to the upcoming elections? 
There is no proof one way or another. Will the SIGAR reports be ignored like reports of 
the past? Only time will tell. The GAO has reported concerns about the quality of 
oversight of the construction in Afghanistan since early 2004,239 when it reviewed the 
expenditure of reconstruction funds from 2002 and 2003. It identified additional 
problems with a follow-on report in July of 2004.240 Both the Department of Defense 
Inspector General (DoD IG)241 and the SIGAR242 expressed similar concerns in their 
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reports in 2008 and 2009 respectfully. Oversight continues to be a problem and many 
audit agencies have addressed the problem with little or no results to show for their work. 
DoD IG and GAO audit reports along with the most recent SIGAR report all detail 
instances where contract oversight problems have resulted in reduced quality and 
increased cost of projects. How can the government ensure the quality of a project or 
service? Oversight. 
Quality management is an important part of ensuring that buildings are 
built to the specifications given in the contract. This is true in the U.S. and in 
Afghanistan. Construction and Service contracts both lack trained contracting officers 
representatives. The 19 May 2009 SIGAR report on CSTC-A, found that “CSTC-A lacks 
effective contract oversight capabilities.”243 CSTC-A was found to have inadequately 
trained staff that did not visit the sites where the work was ongoing.244 CSTC-A agreed 
with the findings and is now using the SIGAR report to obtain the manning, training and 
transportation necessary to put new processes for project management in place.245 Even 
though this report was for a service contract, I experienced similar problems on CSTC-
A’s construction contracts while stationed with the command in 2007. The work in Kabul 
was well covered and monitored, but the projects outside of Kabul were difficult to get to 
due to the lack of transportation options for the Contracting Officer Representative 
(COR’s). In 2007, there were two people to manage all of the Afghan National Police 
Construction. One stayed in Kabul and the other traveled to project sites throughout the 
country. It took on average one week to “bum” rides from other commands to reach all of 
the project sites in a particular province. With projects spread throughout the country, it 
was impossible to visit project sites frequently. PRT’s and ISAF forces were used to look 
in on projects, to ensure construction was indeed taking place. They were not trained to 
do more than take pictures and make initial assessments. They told me the concrete block 
that was being used for a building crumbled in their hands for example. CSTC-A paid an 
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Afghan contractor to provide bi-weekly reports on all of the construction projects. The 
most the CSTC-A staff could do was to check up on those projects when transportation 
allowed, this was on average every other month, in comparison, Engineering Technicians 
(ET’s), who have extensive construction backgrounds, visit projects daily in the U.S.. So, 
why has it taken so long to change the way we oversee contracts? It could be because the 
Afghan conflict was ignored by most audit agencies. This is partly true and can be seen in 
the difference in the abundance of GAO reports on Iraqi reconstruction (40) and the 
Afghan reconstruction reports during the same time period (3). The audit agencies may 
have just been focusing on the conflict where the majority of resources were used as well. 
The recent SIGAR report and CSTC-A response has lead to an increase in manning 
allowing for increased contract oversight,246 a step in the right direction. More research is 
needed to further explore this topic. A soon to be released book, by Thomas Bruneau, 
delves more deeply into the military contractor relationships and how they impact 
National Security.247  
The Army Corps of Engineers is another contracting agency in 
Afghanistan. They have tried to implement a quality management/oversight program 
exactly like the one they use in the U.S. A recent Contract Solicitation released by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Afghanistan Engineer District for an Afghan National 
Police District Headquarters was written as if it were a solicitation for work in the U.S. 
While I agree with this in principle, I do not agree that Afghan contractors are able to 
follow all of the requirements of the solicitation. For example, the Safety portion of the 
contract requires a site safety officer with 30 hour Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) training. Most of the Afghans do not know what OSHA is and 
most are illiterate (28% literacy rate248), so how will they meet this requirement? OSHA 
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does not provide classes in the middle of Afghanistan. Also, the requirement to wear 
Personal Protective Gear will not be followed in most regions because it causes safety 
concerns in some areas. Many Afghans told me that if they were seen wearing safety 
equipment (hardhats, steel-toed shoes and reflective vests) the Taliban would know they 
were working for the Americans and kill them. The quality control section of these 
contracts should also be reviewed. One of the requirements is for the contractor to use 
specific software to provide quality control data to the contracting office. While this may 
be possible in areas like Kabul and Kandahar, this is not possible in the rural areas, which 
accounts for the majority of Afghanistan. Quality control and safety plans should be 
required with every contract, the requirement to have them developed and kept on a 
specific type of software will reduce competition and result in only major companies 
bidding on projects and then subcontracting them to the rural companies to perform the 
work, which can increase cost and bureaucracy. The quality management system used in 
the U.S. will not work in Afghanistan. We need to take a hard look at the solicitations we 
are sending out and ensure that they are consistent with local practices, instead of with 
what we perceive is the right thing. Taking a more cultural approach to contracts and 
construction may go a long way to developing better relationships a better quality 
product. 
3.  Culture 
The United States and its Coalition forces, despite a shift toward a more 
population centric strategy, still need a better understanding of the culture, as well as the 
necessities, which the average Afghan requires to make marked progress against the 
Taliban insurgency.  
The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), an international 
policy think tank, recently published a study based on interviews of Afghan men from 
Kandahar and Helmand provinces.249 They found that 75% of Afghans interviewed 
believe that foreigners are disrespecting their religion and traditions, and violate local 
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customs.250 Afghans cited the cultural insensitivity of foreign forces as one of the main 
causes of their resentment and mistrust.251 These findings show that changes are needed 
in the way we conduct COIN missions in Afghanistan. The need for change is addressed 
in other documents as well, as seen below. 
According to Sean McKenna and Russell Hampsey, the discovery of previously 
mismanaged projects and funding is negatively impacting the stabilization and 
development personnel currently in Afghanistan.252 The mismanagement and lack of 
cultural understanding impacts everyone, the military and civilians trying to provide 
viable projects, and the local communities. I was frustrated myself when I was there in 
2007. On several occasions, I went to grid coordinates where a building was supposed to 
exist, only to find a slab, if that. The government had already paid the contractor, and 
either the grid coordinates for the projects were wrong, or nothing was built. In other 
cases, I saw buildings where the quality was poor and others where the lack of cultural 
sensitivity during design and construction resulted in poor maintenance. For example 
when sinks were fastened to the wall, with no abolution area to wash. The sinks quickly 
fall off the walls from the pressure put on them from the abolution process. McKenna and 
Hampsey recommend that personnel ensure that there is a system of sustainability and 
quality, and try to using local contractors.253 A conference held in Great Britain came to 
similar conclusions. 
The Wilton Park Conference 1022, held in March 2010, had members from 
several sectors of the nation-building effort, to include military, Afghan government, UN 
and NGOs.254 Some of the recommendations found in the report from this conference are 
                                                 
250 ICOS, 14. 
251 Ibid., 57. 
252 McKenna and Hampsey, “Counterinsurgency Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT): “The COIN 
Warrior,” Waging Influence: Hints for the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategy in Afghanistan,” 14. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Thompson, “Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022.” This conference was titled “Winning 
‘Hearts And Minds’ In Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in Coin Operations,” 
and was organized in partnership with the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, with support 
from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), the Asia Pacific Civil-Military 
Centre of Excellence, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
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pertinent to this thesis. The first is to ensure good quality for all projects, which is 
discussed in most documents on COIN and Afghanistan. The quality of projects has been 
traditionally poor for reasons discussed earlier in Chapter IV. The next recommendation 
is to “avoiding cultural faux pas,” which requires the people providing the service or 
projects to be familiar with the culture. Finally, they recommend that “genuine 
consultation, which requires appreciation for local context and culture” be used for all 
projects.255 It is difficult to achieve genuine consultation when the designers of the 
projects never meet the local populations, and sometimes are not even in the country. The 
report states, “from an aid effectiveness perspective, process (over product) will continue 
to be central to how much legitimacy the international community can win for both itself 
and the GIRoA.”256 The way we build, communicating with the local populations, 
understanding their cultural techniques and materials and incorporating them into our 
designs will support the Wilton Park reports argument. A recent RAND report discusses 
similar findings. 
A 2009-RAND report, “It is widely agreed that effective civilian relief, 
reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their 
government against insurgency. Knowing this insurgents will target such work.”257 A 
later report by RAND states, “the frequency with which insurgents attack schools, 
government offices, courthouses, pipelines, electrical grids and the like is evidence that 
civil COIN threatens them.”258 So, insurgents are targeting development projects because 





                                                 
255 Thompson, “Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022,” 16–17. 
256 Ibid., 21. 
257 Gompert, Kelly, Lawson, Parker, and Colloton, “Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and 
Military Counterinsurgency.”  
258 Lawson, Kelly, Parker, Colloton, and Watkins, “Reconstruction under Fire: Case Studies and 
Further Analysis of Civil Requirements: A Companion Volume of Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying 
Civil and Military Counterinsurgency,” 2. 
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involved with a node’s construction or refurbishment, it is widely believed that the public 
will be more likely to protect the node if external threats develop.”259 This was evident in 
Greg Mortenson’s most recent book.260 
Mortenson tells a story of how a mob approached one of the Central Asia 
Institutes Schools, in Afghanistan, after destroying every foreign aid office in the town. 
The mob was upset by a recent Newsweek story about the desecration of the Koran. 
When the mob approached the school, “they were met by a group of elders, who had 
donated the land for the school, organized the laborers who built it, and participated in 
the laying of the corner-stone.” These elders told them that the school “was their school, 
they were proud of it, and they demanded that it be left alone.”261 They were successful, 
the crowd left. This is one example, where the involvement of the local people in the 
construction process created a strong sense of ownership. This sense of ownership was so 
powerful that they are willing to risk their personal safety to ensure that the building is 
secure. Mortenson takes his time, involves the communities in the process, uses local 
materials and techniques, and in the end the schools his organization builds are sustained. 
While the U.S. is on a shorter time line, Mortenson’s example could be used to encourage 
changes in the current construction processes. Mortenson is not the only one who 
understands the need to engage the community. Natsios, a former administrator for 
USAID, includes this in their “Principles for Reconstruction and Development.”262 
Under ownership section he states,  
When ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, the 
citizens will defend, maintain, and expand the project well after donors 
have departed. If what is left behind makes no sense to them, does not 
meet their needs, or does not belong to them, they will abandon it as soon 
as aid agencies leave.263 
                                                 
259 Gompert, Kelly, Lawson, Parker, and Colloton, “Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and 
Military Counterinsurgency,” 33. 
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261 Ibid., 135–139. 
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263 Natsios, “USAID Principles for Reconstruction and Development,” 7. 
 73
David Kilcullen also talks bout how, “Actions that help build trusted networks serve your 
cause.”264 The networks built by using culturally correct processes are powerful as seen 
above.  
There is proof that people take better care of things that they play a part in 
creating, as seen in Mortenson’s example above. People with different backgrounds 
agree, and the Taliban is actively trying to discourage these types of projects.  
Studying the local structures and construction techniques will aid in designing 
culturally acceptable facilities. 
By studying these structures, identified in Chapter I, the reconstruction effort can 
be improved by using the materials and techniques appropriate for that region. In the past 
local techniques have been all but ignored, for reasons discussed in Chapter I. Coalition 
and NGO organizations have required Afghan contractors to build structures from plans 
drawn by architects in the United States, who are not aware of local building techniques 
and cultural norms of the region. Another concern is that these building plans are used for 
the entire country. One set of plans, building materials, building techniques, is used for 
all of Afghanistan. This does not take into account the availability of building materials, 
local population’s ability to build with those materials, or the possibility that the 
traditional materials and techniques may be superior to the ones specified. If we require 
the local construction force to build structures using materials and techniques unfamiliar 
to them, we must understand that the learning curve associated with the production of a 
quality structure will be long and even when built well, the structure may not be 
appropriate for the environment where it is built. “It is a mistake to assume that the 
Afghans will be grateful for, or benefit from, reconstruction aid that is not consistent with 
their environmental experience or cultural heritage.”265 The study of the types of 
dwellings common to each area of the country is required to ensure that local culture and 
techniques are considered when designing and building structures throughout 
Afghanistan. 
                                                 
264 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010). 
265 Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture, 5. 
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The local structures designs are the result of thousands of years of ‘research’ by 
local architects. Foreign aid organizations should explore these techniques before they 
disregard them entirely. The bad-gir is a good example of an addition that is widely used 
locally but rarely incorporated in foreign designs.  
Foreign designers should also consider seismic risk. Some traditional structures 
are designed to withstand seismic tremors. “The earthquake-resistant properties of senj 
construction were undoubtedly learned in part by observing which buildings, or parts o 
buildings, remained standing after severe tremors.”266 There are many local traditions 
that should be considered when building in Afghanistan.  
Another tradition is how the local builders orient structures. Review of the 
orientation of local structures show that they normally face the south and southeast. This 
orientation allows the maximum amount of solar energy during the winter and minimum 
in the summer. These techniques should be taken into consideration when building new 
facilities as well. A short interview with a local builder, or research into the regional 
norms, should be incorporated into the architect’s time when designing structures in 
Afghanistan. This will ensure that local techniques are considered and possibly 
incorporated into the designs. Review of the different structures is the basic level of 
knowledge required.  
An example of the U.S. forcing foreign construction techniques on Afghan 
contractors can be found in a project that took place in Nuristan in 2007. The foreign 
designers specified a metal building, with rolled insulation, for a town in Nuristan. The 
prime contractor out of Kabul hired workers local to the region for the construction of the 
facility. The foreign contracting agency did not take local construction techniques into 
consideration when designing this facility. The local builders, tried to follow the design 
on the drawings. Due to the lack of experience with the materials and techniques needed 
to build this structure, they failed miserably.  
The metal trusses were spot welded and did not overlap as required to provide a 
structurally sound facility. The addition of a snow load in the region made the buildings 
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structural integrity more precarious. Also, the metal beams were not painted with rust 
resistant paint. Rust and corrosion was already evident. Finally, the local builders had 
never worked with rolled insulation. Their buildings are insulated with the thick rock and 
wood walls. They installed the insulation from the inside out, leaving the insulation 
exposed to the environment while attaching the exterior metal panels. This resulted in wet 
insulation that was already showing signs of mold. After a sight visit by the foreign 
agency, a decision was made to allow the use of the traditional construction techniques. 
These techniques and materials were better suited for this region of Afghanistan. The 
materials were locally available, unlike the material used in the foreign structure. The 
cost of transporting the metal materials was significant as the roads in this region are 
precarious at best, with frequent avalanches and floods blocking roads for days or 
months. This is a case where a little cultural knowledge could have saved the foreign 
agency time and money and the local builders the embarrassment of failure.  
Another example is construction of some facilities in the Mazar-I-Sharif region. 
This facility called for a series of wooden huts. Approximately three years after the huts 
were built, significant deterioration was found due to wood boring insects. After a short 
consultation with a local builder, the foreign organization, which provided the initial 
funding for the construction were informed the local tradition called for buildings built 
without wood. This was due to the lack of availability of wood and the insect problem. 
The entire facility would need to be replaced. If the local builders would have been 
consulted from the beginning, the foreign agency could have saved time and money. 
Again, the designer was designing the facility far away from the local area. An 
assumption was made that the same design could be used throughout Afghanistan. Had 
the designer traveled to the region, they might have notice the domed roofs and asked 
why it was so prevalent in the region. Even if they did not have time for the trip, a short 
phone consultation with a local builder would have resulted in a design more appropriate 
for the region. The local population looks at the facilities being built and wonders what 
the foreign countries are thinking.  
Another recent development that will further increase the cost in both lives and 
dollars for using non-indigenous materials is the ban of security contractors in 
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Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai announced on 17 August 2010, “ordering the 
disbanding of private security forces in Afghanistan by the end of the year.”267 This is a 
significant development, as the transportation of materials throughout Afghanistan 
currently requires security to ensure their delivery. The use of locally supplied materials 
is now a critical piece to the reconstruction effort. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This first part of this chapter defined COIN, Insurgency, and Stability Operations 
and discussed how they were related to each other and to the reconstruction effort. 
Construction was shown to be a critical piece of all of the five tasks of stability 
operations and since the construction mission is contracted out in Afghanistan, a 
discussion of the challenges of contracting is necessary to understand the challenges to 
construction and COIN.  
Several challenges to construction contracting in Afghanistan were identified and 
discussed. Coordination, capacity building, and corruption are critical to ensuring that 
quality structures are built. Solving these challenges alone will not result in winning the 
hearts and minds of many Afghans. Even if all of these challenges were resolved, there 
would still be quality problems. Why?  
I contend that the most critical piece is missing. Culture. We can build the best 
buildings in the world, but if they are not what the Afghans want then it was a waste of 
our time and money. If winning the trust and confidence of the Afghans is tied to 
developing an effective Afghan government, and construction is a part of that, then we 
will fail until we put all of the pieces of the puzzle together. If the contracts require the 
use of locally acquired materials, the local economy will benefit and the cost of 
transportation, both in lives and money, will be reduced. The requirement for techniques 
familiar to the Afghans, will increase the quality, which will reduce the amount of 
oversight, reduce their maintenance cost, which reduces the capacity needed to maintain 
the facility and increases the pride in the facility, reducing the pilfering.  
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This chapter shows how COIN is tied to Stability Operations, which is tied to 
construction, which is tied to contracting, and when construction is performed in a 
culturally correct manner, can insight passion strong enough for local leaders to put their 
safety at risk for the security of the building. This is powerful. We need to get this right.  
 78
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 79
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
SIGAR, GAO, DOD IG and other inspection organizations have a plethora of 
recommendations when it comes to construction contracting in Afghanistan. As discussed 
before, all of these organizations miss the cultural aspect of construction. The key to 
understanding the culture in Afghanistan, is taking the time to learn about it. Drink tea. 
Talk to people. Allow them time to interact, instead of telling them what to do. My 
recommendations are broken down into three simple areas: educate, feedback, and re-
evaluate and incorporate feedback. These are described in greater detail below. 
1. Educate 
Designers, engineers, acquisition personnel, and military leaders must be educated 
about culturally correct construction. They should also learn the importance of using 
indigenous materials and techniques and how their use can support the COIN mission, 
reduce time and transportation cost and possibly save lives.  
2. Feedback 
The local communities and governments should be involved in all steps of the 
construction process, from project inception to construction completion and finally 
sustainment. They should be given the opportunity to comment at all times, so that these 
comments can be incorporated into the construction process. How much we build is not 
as important as how we build and the communities’ acceptance of these facilities.  
3. Re-Evaluate and Incorporate Feedback 
Use the feedback from the local populations and allow changes to processes. We 
traditionally attempt to force our culture and techniques on local populations without a 
desire to understand and respect theirs. Instead of ignoring the depth of knowledge that 
the local population brings, we should embrace it and use it as a catalyst for research into 
more sustainable techniques. Processes should be continually evaluated for improvement. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the reported weakness in the design and construction of U.S.-sponsored 
facilities in Afghanistan, culturally sensitive construction will improve outcomes. The use 
of indigenous materials and techniques also has the potential to save time, money and 
lives, through the reduced need for material transportation. If culturally and 
environmental sensitive construction techniques are of higher sustainability, then the 
benefits of change of philosophy are quite clear. Projects would be driven by local 
demands and built in accordance with local conditions and standards. Thus would foster 
ownership and likely reduce corruption.  
An appreciation of the aid and reconstruction history of Afghanistan can be used 
to ensure cohesive interaction between all parties involved in today’s reconstruction 
mission. The amount of players involved in the reconstruction effort has created a 
complicate web for the military to navigate. Cooperate and coordinate is a must to ensure 
mission accomplishment. 
Coordination is not the only issue plaguing the reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan. Capacity building, corruption, and quality control have all been identified 
by inspection agencies as issues that need to be corrected. All of these agencies have 
missed what I believe is the most important piece. Culture. Without a cultural 
understanding of the Afghan landscape, a true connection to the Afghan people will not 
be possible. This connection is critical to the COIN mission. As shown in Chapter IV, 
construction is an integral part of the COIN mission. 
The DoDs contracting processes must allow for culturally correct materials and 
techniques that support the COIN mission. Time money and possibly lives are at stake.  
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APPENDIX A. 
A. SECTION 1: PHYSICAL MAPS 
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273 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 255. 
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B. SECTION 2: POLITICAL/POPULATION MAPS 
 
 










                                                 















                                                 







Figure 9.   Ethnolinguistic Group Distribution Map of Afghanistan.276  
                                                 
276 Produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, Reprinted from the University of Texas Perry-
Castaneda Library Map Collection, 1997, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnoling_97.jpg. 
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APPENDIX B. 




Plate 1. Sketch of a Durrani Vaulted Black Tent277 
                                                 




Plate 2. Sketch of a Baluch Vaulted Black Tent278 
 
 
Plate 3. Sketch of a Ghilzai Peaked Black Tent279 
 
                                                 
278 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 39. 
279 Ibid., 43. 
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Plate 4. Sketch of a Brahui Peaked Black Tent280 
 
Plate 5. Sketch of a Taimani Black Tent281 
                                                 
280 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 47. 
281 Ibid., 49. 
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Plate 6. Sketch of a Jugi Cotton Tent282 
 
 
Plate 7. Sketch of a Jat Cotton Tent283 
 
 
                                                 
282 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 53. 
283 Ibid., 57. 
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Photo 1. Jat Cotton Tents outside Kabul284 
 
Plate 8. Cutaway Sketch of a Domical Yurt285 
                                                 
284 Taken by the author. 




Plate 9. Sketch of a Conical Yurt286 
 
Plate 10. Sketch of a Circular Hut287 
                                                 
286 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 69. 
287 Ibid., 75. 
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Plate 11. Sketch of a Circular Hut with Center Pole288 
 
Plate 12. Sketch of a Polygonal Hut289 
                                                 
288 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 83. 
289 Ibid., 87. 
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Plate 13. Sketch of an Ovate-Oblong Hut290 
 
 
Plate 14. Sketch of an Ovate-Oblong Hut291 
                                                 
290 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 99. 
291 Ibid., 103. 
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B. SECTION 2: SEDENTARY DWELLING SKETCHES 
 
Plate 15. Sketch of Curved-Roof Buildings292 
 
Plate 16. Sketch of Curved-Roof Construction (Single Vault)293 
 
                                                 
292 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 119. 
293 Ibid., 123. 
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Plate 17. Sketch of Curved-Roof Construction (Multiple Vaults)294 
 
 
Plate 18. Sketch of Flat-Roof Buildings295 
  
 
                                                 
294 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 127. 
295 Ibid., 135. 
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Photo 2. Interior Look at Roof Structure Showing Brick Wall Structure296 
 
Photo 3. Flat Roof Construction in Khost297 
                                                 




Photo 4. Erosion of Mud/Clay Mixture on a Clay Structure298 
 
Plate 19. Sketch of a Fortified Compound299 
 
                                                 
298 Taken by the author. 















Plate 20. Sketch of Nuristani Flat-Roof Construction300 
 
                                                 
300 Reprinted from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 149. 
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APPENDIX C.  
A. SECTION 1: NONSEDENTARY DWELLING DATABASE 
 
Database 1. Nonsedentary Afghan Dwellings301 
                                                 
301 Compiled from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 
Architecture, 32–37, 38–41, 42–45, 46–47, 48–49, 52–55, 56–58, 62–67, 68–71, 74–77, 78–81, 82v83, 84–
85, 86–89, 90–93, 84–97, 98–101, 102–107, 108–110. 
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B. SECTION 2: SEDENTARY DWELLING DATABASE 
 
Database 2. Sedentary Afghan Dwellings302 
                                                 
302 Compiled from Szabo, Barfield, and Sekler, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic 




A. SECTION 1: CASE STUDY #1 
All photos in this section taken by Combined Security Transition Command—
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Combined Joint Engineering (CJEng) Staff in 2007. 
  
Photo 5. Truss Structures Photo 6. Rusting Truss Spot Welded 
  




Photo 9. Typical Nuristani Construction 
 
Photo 10. Interior Room Construction, Notice the Tongue and Groove Ceiling 
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Photo 11. Close Up of Wall and Window Construction 
 




Photo 13. Hillside Dwellings in Nuristan 
 









Photo 16. Mixing the Traditional Clay and Hay Wall and Roof Coverings 
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B. SECTION 2: CASE STUDY #2 
 
 
Photo 17. Typical Wooden Structure Built throughout the Country 
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